

JOURNAL of APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

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SOME ASPECTS OF SMALL'S SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES

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TO THE STUDENT of the development of systems of thought and of the assumptions and logical processes involved therein, there is peculiar interest in the origin and growth of sociology in this country. In such a study one cannot ignore the work of those one might class as pioneers, nor could one neglect the part played by Dr. Small in his various rôles as teacher, writer, critic, and associate. We have no very accurate technique of measuring such materials as systems of thought, their growth and influence, but we do, in course of time, frequently arrive at some consensus of opinion which serves as a partial substitute for a better accuracy than we now have.

Whether Dr. Small has left any permanent contributions to sociology is a matter which we cannot answer now, for we do not know enough about the possible ramifications of the future to be able to predict with any confidence. Some of us feel that he has. We can be sure that, as a factor in the development of discussion, as a stimulant of thinking, he occupied a most important place in our midst for more than three decades. His own conception of his rôle was a very modest one. He conceived sociology to be a veritable resultant necessity of modern thought as applied to social phenomena. In that naturalistic growth, he thought of himself and his contemporaries as instruments of a larger, inevitable movement. It seems quite

evident, however, that we must credit him and them with a good deal in actually creating this thing we call sociology. Without Small, Ross, Giddings, Ward, Blackmar, Ellwood and others, most of us would be in greatly altered situations.

One who attempts to summarize in a few pages the theories of a prolific writer whose productions cover a span of more than a third of a century enters upon a hazardous undertaking. One is forced to adopt a very drastic method of limiting one's treatment. Possibly the simplest and safest method for the purpose here is that of frankly admitting a very personal, subjective selection which is, indeed, as much a reflection of the thought of the writer as of the theories reviewed. Accordingly we shall deal only with some of the theories which, for the moment, seem most clearly in the line of vision. The summary will be increasingly personalized since it will depend on certain impressions, conversations, and notes derived from personal contacts inside and outside the class room, which naturally find no exact reproduction in Dr. Small's printed pages.

I assume that most surveys of Dr. Small's theories would touch, among others, some of the following themes: the nature and place of sociology, the origins of sociology, the social process, the group concept, the drive toward objectivity, the unity of social science, the sociological approach to ethics, interests, the historical method applied to sociology, and sociological concepts as tools of thought. Others might be added, but these are more than sufficient for our purpose. Permitting our personal bias to direct our attention we may enlarge a little on some of the themes suggested.

It would be highly interesting to deal with these theories genetically in an attempt to trace their birth and subse-

quent growth into living doctrines or discarded errors. This would, of course, bring into the range of our attention almost the whole movement of sociological thought in this country, for Dr. Small was in such close touch with every phase of it from the very beginning that his thinking was one pole of a bipolar situation in which neither can be understood apart from the other. We shall have to forego such an attempt, though it may be convenient from time to time to intersperse references to some of his earlier ideas.

In such an highly experimental and naïve adventure as the course of sociology in the United States from 1890 to 1925, one might easily have cause, as Dr. Small frequently did, to disavow some of his earlier views. In many respects, too, the recantation was complete, but it seems that one might have much ground for saying that certain fundamental characteristics of Dr. Small's thinking remained intact through the period, and that the change, that at first seems to be abrupt and clear, is but the outward dressing, the form embracing much the same content, the same essential philosophy. Not that there was no growth in his thought, for there was, but that in some respects, either by accident or by controlled and accurate reflection, Dr. Small's philosophy fitted in with some of the assumptions that continued to guide sociological discussion during those years.

By this I mean such characteristics as these: the ethical rôle of social science generally, and sociology in particular; the conception of sociology as social philosophy; the economic and historical background of sociology; the use of logical reflection rather than accurate and detailed investigation of concrete situations as a means of arriving at generalizations; the conception of unity, of wholeness characterizing social phenomena. These fitted in well with that phase of sociology which some have considered as the pre-

research stage of the movement in this country, where "research" is confined to detailed investigation of actual concrete situations.

This reference to the shift of attention to research must not be construed to mean that any or all of these earlier characteristics have necessarily passed out of the sociological movement in this country, for it is quite apparent, for example, that some sort of system, explicit, or implicit, must constitute a background for the detailed studies. There can be no denying, however, that the trend, the emphasis, is toward what we may call research in the narrow sense indicated, excluding studies in social theory, social philosophy, and methods of thought. Dr. Small was well aware of this shift in emphasis and attention and was entirely sympathetic toward it. He did feel, however, as he often stated, that there was still room in sociology for a few persons whose interests and experience qualified them better for the rôle of methodologist and philosopher. Probably sociology in the future will vindicate his judgment on this point.

We must also guard against the impression that, because Dr. Small was philosophic in his approach, he was necessarily metaphysical. No note was sounded more often in his expressions than the necessity of persistent and constant attention to the actual social order itself as the source and proving ground for all thought,—the "drive toward objectivity," as he called it. His thinking permitted no institution, no agency, no academic subject to escape the actual tests of experience. He was, at heart, a thoroughgoing pragmatist. Some of his most eloquent passages were voiced in behalf of a philosophy of science as opposed to that of speculation.

Now to deal a little more specifically with some of his theories. First of all, how does he define the field of soci-

ology? What is its nature and its rôle? These questions he was frequently called upon to answer, not only in controversial situations, but also by an inward restlessness with his own preceding earlier formulations. We shall confine ourselves chiefly to his later views on this matter.

I am not aware that Dr. Small ever deserted the thesis expressed in the following words:

The emphasis at this point is on the fact that sociology is primarily *knowledge* not *action*. It is detailed knowledge, analytical knowledge, it is all-around, inclusive, synthetic knowledge of the whole social reality. . . . The thought is not to frame a science that ends with knowing; for no knowledge is complete until it passes into action. The aim is science that will naturally pass into doing. In order to have such a science, the basis must be laid in knowledge which is as general, and as abstract, and objective, and disinterested as though mere statement of truth were the final thing to be desired.¹

Nothing needs to be added to this to clarify it. It is worth noting, however, that he characteristically placed the immediate task as that of deriving knowledge and, as elsewhere more carefully expressed, deplored the premature attempts to apply something which had not yet been created. Unfortunately, we are still painfully aware of the almost complete failure to complete the task which he laid down as the first essential, namely, the development of a science.

To be able to frame a science in this respect, that is, to be able to develop a general science, demands that there be something general and abstract pervading the concrete, which may be observed, analyzed, measured. Hence Dr. Small was at all times occupied with the effort to arrive at a definition of this common element in social phenomena.

¹ *General Sociology*, pp. 34-35.

Despite the various terms in which he seemed to describe it at different times, I do not find significant changes in the motive of the quest for the general. So that, whether he dealt with "association," or "the social process," or the "group," he was interested in setting forth the general aspects of social phenomena. The uniformities independent of time and place, were logical objects of his quest, and sociology for him was the result of the attempt to find that essential uniformity. Once this is found, whatever we call it, it constitutes the field of thought and investigation not only for sociology but for all social sciences as well.

It was his quest for the general rather than the particular, that led him, in some of his earlier claims for sociology, to take the position characteristic of sociologists at the time, which he later discarded, namely, that sociology is the general to which the other social sciences are subject special sciences. Later he specifically defined its rôle as a much more humble one, when having abandoned its claims to the master position, he seeks to justify it as one of the co-ordinated "techniques" attacking the common problem, having a subject matter and a technique peculiar to itself. Whether the logic of his thought justified his later position is a nice question, but one which must be deferred to another time.

Taking our materials from his later thought (I am here relying largely on notes taken in his classes), how does he define sociology as a fellow among the other social sciences? First of all, Dr. Small never deserted the position set forth in the *Meaning of Social Science*, that social science is one. Within that general field, however, he observes varying "techniques," as he was fond of phrasing it, which were tools of analysis of the common reality. "Sociology is one of the many techniques which make up the equipment of social science as a whole." It has become that portion of

the whole which starts with the assumption that human phenomena are phenomena of groups. The analysis of group relations is the distinct contribution of sociology and this seems to be the only "justification for its claim to rank as an independent technique." Said Dr. Small, "This is the only thing that I can see that justifies sociology and puts it on a par with other social sciences."

In response to the logical demand for an exhibit of the tools, methods, devices, making up the special equipment of sociology, Dr. Small did not present a series of statistical devices, nor a plan of population study in a given area, nor a scheme for determining a community, nor a technique for measuring mobility of persons, nor a method of analyzing personality. On the contrary, he offered a series of categories,—tools of logic. His answer was the reply of a philosopher and logician, not that of an experimental scientist. This is not stated as adverse criticism, but as an apparent fact. It was his way of acting in the situation presented by social science in this country on the one hand, and his experience and training, on the other.

Concerning his use of such concepts as groups, social process, interest, it is apparent that they were related in his thinking. The fact that in some of his later writings he came to stress the importance of one or the other did not mean, necessarily, a deviation or desertion from a former position. As elucidated by him, the relation was a necessary one and was somewhat as follows: The observation of human reality reveals a constant movement, a complex interrelated whole which he designated the social process. Further observation discloses that this mass may be broken up into several aspects for the purposes of analysis, although such analysis usually tends to destroy the essential unity and wholeness of the pattern. In this sense we can then discern certain "units of experience," or groupings of

human beings. These units, or groups, constitute the essential realities with which sociology is concerned. Now what of the interests? These, he stated, do not constitute a part of the true sociological unit. They are but means of analysis as applied in terms of explanation of the groups themselves. They are the assumed elements in the formation and maintenance of the groups. They might be considered as the elements of the group reality in the sense that they motivate the persons observed. The origin of such wants, he continued, is a problem for psychology and biology, not for sociology, since the latter begins only where persons are found in groups. Concerning Dr. Small's concept of interests it may be observed that some such device has been a constant refuge for all types of students of human behavior, as Bernard, Faris, and others have pointed out. Its form changes, but the logical device persists in some form or other, in almost all contemporary social theory.

In regard to the concept of the group, which bulked so large in Dr. Small's later thought, it may be remarked again that it was not a sudden achievement of his. Fundamentally, it was a statement of a general idea which had animated his thinking for many years.² Dr. Small himself points out that as early as 1890, the group concept was present in his mind and cites a passage from his *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* in support of his position. Though a part of his early terminology, it did not become the core of his thinking until more recently. It was only after a lifetime of search that he reached the conclusion that "Sociology has become the first attempt to organize a technique for scientific interpretation of human experience upon the basis of the group hypothesis in contrast with the individual hypothesis."³

² *Origins of Sociology*, pp. 344-345.

³ *Origins of Sociology*, p. 346.

Dr. Small felt that in the group concept he had found, not only the goal toward which the sociological movement had actually moved, but also the answer to his own quest for a logical and satisfactory definition of sociology. The closing pages of his *Origins of Sociology* reveal a sense of security after a troubled voyage started some forty years before when he set out from fairly well established boundaries of older philosophies and sciences. He had found in the concept of the group the subject matter which entitled sociology to a position, not at the head of the social sciences as he once hoped, but as a common laborer in the ranks, engaged in the common process of discovery of truth in the world of social phenomena. "At best," he says, "sociologists have found a clue by means of which social science as a whole closes in on the facts and meanings of human experience somewhat more adequately than our knowledge could extend without this addition to research equipment. That is all, and that is enough."⁴

Turning our attention for the moment from the group, as the proper subject matter of sociology, to the concept of the individual, we find that he reached the position that the individual was an inaccurate category (referring again to my notes). Not that he questioned the reality of the things observable as persons, but that, with the implications of the term given it by individualistic thinkers, it had become a misleading term, for which he would substitute the term personality to indicate what he intended in chapter 32 of his *General Sociology*. Adopted in its older atomistic sense, the term individual would logically entail the disappearance of sociology, he insisted.

On the other hand, the term personality involves the idea of the result of the group process, of the group life. As Dr. Small used the term, it meant what is sometimes covered by the use of the term *self*. In this sense, the term

⁴ *Origins of Sociology*, p. 351.

individual can be safely used to designate the fact of personality as a resultant reality in a social world. Certain passages might be quoted from Dr. Small's older writings which are capable of the interpretation he deplored in his later thinking, but, on the other hand, it is easy to cite numerous passages which give exact expression of an adequate comprehension of the person as a social product. It is quite true that Dr. Small did not possess the means to set forth the mechanism of the creational process involved, but it is quite certain that he grasped the importance of it. It is hardly necessary to point out that this note has been consistently stressed by some sociologists and constitutes the basis of the environmental interpretation of individual behavior, upon which they have insisted. That some of the older thinkers had not grasped the significance of this idea was conceded by Dr. Small, but nevertheless, he conceived it to be fundamental to the existence of sociology.

What has now become of the concept of association, which played so prominent a part in the sociological terminology of an earlier period? How would Dr. Small fit it into his later concepts? His answer was quite simple. The term *group*, he explained, is a concept of existence; association is a category of movement. The latter calls attention to the activity of the group and the movements of the members thereof. It is a convenient expression used to cover all reactions between persons, whatever they may be.

One might easily conclude from Dr. Small's discussions of the concept of the individual and the group, that his argument is lacking in a clear analysis of the process by which the personality is produced out of a social situation. That is true; he does not bridge that important gap, but, for that matter, it was long ago pointed out by Mead⁵ that this was cardinal weakness in social psychology and it must be admitted that the various social psychologies

⁵ *Psychological Bulletin*, December 15, 1909.

which have appeared since Mead's stricture have helped to clarify the defect without adding much to the solution of the problem. The development of the self, the person, the personality, whatever one may call it, is the center around which much discussion in social psychology has revolved, but, even among those devoting themselves to the problem, there is no agreement, even in the conception of the issue involved. Dr. Small did not claim to do more than to insist that an adequate understanding of the person, the self, demanded, among other things, the adequate valuation of the groups within which the person lived from birth.

Dr. Small's contributions to the history of sociology are so well known that but a few observations are necessary on that point. It was his conception that such a history was not only valid as an object of research but that it also was the best practical method of beginning the serious study of sociology. In accordance with this conviction he arranged his courses at the University of Chicago so that the History of Sociology preceded his *General Sociology*. In applying the historical method to sociology, Dr. Small was guided by some very definite beliefs as to the way in which any science comes into existence. In general, his belief was that the process is a naturalistic one. A science does not develop in conformity with the predetermined logical systems worked out in advance by its advocates. It is a process of discovery, of trial and error, a growth. "Science," he said, "is predetermined by the relations of cause and effect which operate in the reaches of reality in question, not by any definition of scope or method which can be arrived at before those reaches of reality have been explored."⁶ Sociologists themselves had furnished a good example of the wrong method of procedure. They persisted in defining their science, Dr. Small thought, "before they had been taught what their procedure must be by

⁶ *Origins of Sociology*, p. 340.

hard experience with their phenomena." He did not consider the mistake a fatal one for sociology had gradually unburdened itself of its defective method as soon as the mass of its erroneous preconceptions manifested its inadequacy.

Dr. Small's thesis in regard to the origin of sociology was that it "has a venerable ancestry." It was a phase of the development of social science as a whole. It is "merely one of the latest articulations of this completer self-expression by the great body of students of human experience." In tracing sociology's "venerable ancestry" back he came to the following general conclusions: First, that the reputed origin from Comte was a "myth"; second, that the fertilizing ideas came from German sources, although the early sociologists in this country were familiar with both Comte and Spencer; third, that sociology was a natural result of the narrowness and inadequacy of the older social philosophies and social sciences.

Among the shortcomings of the older social sciences and philosophies, Dr. Small enumerated several, among which are the following: the lack of an adequate comprehension of the subject matter of social science; concern with only a phase or part of the whole social reality; an inadequate apprehension of the interrelatedness of their respective fields of interest; their smug sectarianism; and the absence of a co-ordinating philosophy of social reality. It was these defects, in Dr. Small's opinion, which both in Germany and the United States, made inevitable something which, in the course of time, came to be called sociology.

In his account of the development of sociology he was primarily interested in tracing the development of a social philosophy or a logic of the social sciences. He dealt with methods, scope, logical assumptions, views of relationships, concepts, etc. He was not tracing the changes tak-

ing place in the natural sciences, particularly in biology and psychology, which, perhaps, more than any other influenced the trends in sociology in this country. The steady process of carrying over from biology and psychology has been a very important influence in shaping the terminology, concepts, methods, and subject matter of sociology. I do not assume for a moment that Dr. Small was unaware of this or ignored it. He was merely tracing one line of influence which, by reason of his knowledge in the field of the history of social sciences, particularly the German, was congenial to his interests and his training. More than any one else in this country, perhaps, he was qualified to write that chapter in the story of the rise of sociology in this country. I do not find any indication that he implied that his chapter was to constitute the whole volume that might be written.

Now that sociology has become established on a stable foundation, what, asks Dr. Small, are its achievements, other than those already suggested? First of all, there are the results in the form of benefits to those who have had a part in the movement. Secondly, there is the enormous "mass of insights into specific group reactions collected by local surveys, by social analysis, by the case methods, by the anthropological and ethnological sociologists and by social psychologists." Finally, in his own particular field of effort, he discerned a distinct contribution to objectivity in method, to constructive criticism of technique, namely, the development of more adequate categories of social inquiry in the form of concepts. Not that the list of categories is complete, but that this fundamental step in the formation of a science has been taken, for "working toward such an equipment is the most fundamental merit of general sociology thus far." To the achievement of such a task Dr. Small devoted the best of his intellectual life and it was his reward to feel that it was not in vain.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL'S SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

MAURICE H. KROUT

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AMERICAN social science stands bereaved of a great leader. Albion Woodbury Small is no more. On March 24, 1926, at the age of seventy-one, the pioneer sociologist passed away.

This paper does not deal with the fascinating personality, the broad erudition, the fruitful academic career, or the various achievements for which Professor Small is known. It does not even propose to epitomize the many published writings of Professor Small. This is merely an attempt to outline the development of his sociological theory, a development which had its roots in the benevolent idealism of the last century and reached its peak in the scientific objectivism which A. W. Small has bequeathed to our generation.

I

The interdependence of the sociological and the social-reform movements has received sufficient recognition to be considered a fact.¹ More than one pioneer in sociology has traced his career to a sympathetic insight into the melioristic literature and activities of the last century. Not that the founders of sociology started out invariably as reform-

¹ *Vide* Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought*; Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*; Burgess, "The Interdependence of Sociology and Social Work," *Journal of Social Forces*, v: 1922-23; and Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 210.

ers. Professor Small's career at any rate is not a case in point. Small's attitude was essentially that of a scholar; and his efforts were focused not upon meliorative work as such but on the possibility of building up a science basic to social reform. Accordingly, Small sought inspiration alike in the social movements of the eighties and in the theories of the English economists and the continental social scientists. As the scope of his interests widened, he included also the several types of sociology afloat in Europe and America at the time.

The only indigenous American sociology of that period was that of Lester F. Ward. After the latter published his *Dynamic Sociology* (1883) there was a lull in sociological theorization for nearly a decade. Students of "society" and social problems were analyzing Ward's effective challenge to Herbert Spencer. Many of those who perceived the implications of Ward's "telic progress" as a substitute for Spencer's "do-nothingism" hailed Ward a prophet and a seer. Yet some scholars, while not denying the timeliness and value of Ward's attitude, remained unconvinced as to the finality of Ward's doctrines. Those who were not in agreement with all of Ward's pronouncements decided to survey the field of existing theory in the social sciences with the view to the formulation of some synthetic theory of their own. Among these was Professor Small.²

In 1890 Small published his first text in sociology. As he later himself described it, his *Syllabus, an Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, was a concatenation of the principles of Christian ethics, Utilitarian philosophy, Comtean scientific method, and in a general way, of Spencer's doctrines, minus their *laissez faire* element which he flatly repudiated in favor of Ward's position. Principal among

² All sociologists, with the possible exception of Ward, started out in similar fashion.

these in point of benefit to Small were the conception of the Good in the abstract, which he owed to Christian ethics; the appreciation of the practical Good as a goal for sociology, for which he was indebted to Utilitarian philosophy; and the conception of the scientific method, which he received from Comte.³

The general aim of sociology was conceived by Small in terms of the Biblical ideal. In fact, in those early years sociology seemed to him so completely synonymous with religious ethics that he concluded the book by setting down the precept: "Let us set ourselves heartily to the work of bringing in the kingdom of God on earth."⁴

Small has given two reasons for deciding rather early to discard this *Syllabus* as a text in sociology and a guide to his own thinking. He soon discovered that the *Syllabus*, in his own words, "contained not a system but a hodge podge."⁵ Also, Small began to realize that Comtean positivism had proved useless, as a method, to Comte himself. Consequently, Small began directing his efforts toward the substitution of a methodology of his own, derived from the whole body of social science criticism to which he had been introduced by the German and Austrian writers.

This break with theoretical subjectivism was decisive, although for some time to come Small's attitude, like that of the social scientist of an earlier day, remained a strange blending of idealism and realism. In another *Syllabus* published in 1894, but prepared earlier, Small offered side by side such exhibitions of nominalism as "Man at his worst represents a splendid fragment of a great ideal,"⁶

³ Small, "Some Contributions to the History of Sociology," *Am. Jour. of Sociol.*, Nov., 1924.

⁴ Small, *Syllabus-I*, pp. 81 and 149.

⁵ Small, "Some Contributions," etc., *Am. Jour. of Sociol.*, Nov., 1924.

⁶ Small, *Syllabus-II*, p. 12.

and such definitions indicative of realistic leanings as "Religion (is) . . . the right attitude of the person toward every element of reality."⁷

As presented in the second *Syllabus*, Small's sociological scheme embraced the following points:

1. "Sociology frankly proposes the salvation of society."⁸

2. "In past centuries men have worked at the problem instinctively. They are now approaching it systematically."⁹

3. "While sociology is primarily concerned with Social Facts, it uses them as the raw material of social ideals."¹⁰

4. "The ideal of society is not a social order wished for, regardless of unalterable facts; it is the social order which will result from use of all known facts."¹¹

Small now took the position, however, that in a study of society religion is not the exclusive but merely one element of the "only adequate means of approach to rational social ideals." On the basis of this altered view he concluded that the task of sociology must consist of the threefold plan of ascertaining what the actual social world is, deciding what the ideal social world ought to be, and discovering ways and means of changing the actual into the ideal.¹²

The eclectic sociology which Small presented in his first *Syllabus* and the outline presented in his second *Syllabus* had both served a vital purpose. Aside from the practicability of the aims set forth in those publications, the view of sociology as principally concerned with social-reform ideals was not without value. Small's reference to the "kingdom of God on earth" had in it implications whose vidity was not diminished, even if it was not strengthened, by their theology.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Those who shared with Small the "spirit of scientific social reform" felt painfully that sight had been lost of tangible reality in the process of determining its plan of construction. This was an epoch characterized by leniency toward philosophical speculation. In such an epoch something was needed to awaken men to the realization that a social world was in existence which at least was as much in need of investigation concretely as it was in need of consideration abstractly. Obviously, before some stimulus was provided which thrust these men into the "stark processes of concrete social facts" there was no hope for a scientific sociology. The horse must be put before the cart. Apart from reality nothing concerning it could be found. This point Small's syllabi strongly emphasized, and by doing so made Small's theory of that day a connecting link between the structural sociology of Spencer, Sumner, and Ward and the functional sociology of another school of social thinkers who were coming to the fore and of whom Small himself was to be a prominent representative.

II

In 1894 George E. Vincent co-operated with Dr. Small in writing a text-book entitled *Introduction to the Study of Society*. This book was founded on the system of a German social thinker, Albert Schaeffle, whom Small and Vincent were the first to introduce to the sociological public in America. Small had known Schaeffle prior to the appearance of the *Introduction*, for his *Syllabus* of 1890 had included, among others, Schaeffle's views. Not until 1894, however, had Small decided to turn definitely to the German organicist for a "long attempt to find reality by his method."

Spencer was the first to establish the fact of social unity through a detailed comparison of social structure with bio-

logical structure. Albert Schaeffle who published his three-volume work, *Bau und Leben des sozialen Koerpers*, in 1874 was the first to emphasize functional, as distinguished from structural, analogies in the life of the animal organism and that of the social body. Both Spencer and Schaeffle had been impressed with the vital bearing of the theory of evolution upon the existing conception of social life. Both adopted the biological method of approach. The essential difference between the theories of these men lay in the fact that Schaeffle spoke of function as preceding structure, for to him structure seemed dependent on its own activities for development; whereas Spencer considered morphology primary and physiology secondary. Spencer accordingly held *individuals acting* to be the proper subject matter of sociology. Schaeffle, however, insisted that *action itself* was of paramount importance to social science. Spencer saw the social organism existing for the benefit of the individual members constituting it. Schaeffle's view on the contrary was that the parts exist only in order that the whole might live and thrive.

The organs or "parts making up the whole" Schaeffle considered endowed with the ability not only to come in contact with each other but also to co-operate. In fact, he assumed the organism to depend for its existence upon the co-operation of its parts. Society was thus for Schaeffle an immense "co-operative concern of mutual services."

Co-operation was an important element in Schaeffle's theory. Still, it was the co-operation of separate parts in the function of the whole, a function which necessarily left the individuals free from one another. In other words, Schaeffle's type of mutual service did not stranglehold the individuals, and left them relatively as free as are the members of a plant community.¹³

¹³ Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, pp. 88-89; Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 157-182.

At any rate the achievement of Schaeffle was a distinct advance over the views of Spencer and Ward. Schaeffle shifted the focus of attention from what "society" is to what "society" does. This constituted the transition from the structural to the functional conception of society.

Schaeffle's principle of functional adaptations of social parts served as a keynote of the text-book in sociology which Small and Vincent jointly produced in 1894. In terms of this principle Small and Vincent conceived the beginnings of ultimate social ethics, and so the transition from the vague yearnings for reform in accordance with "social idealics" to a complete adaptation of social action to functional demands, through a constructive sociology. Small now expounded the view that the noblest aspirations cannot furnish technical skill or information. "Piety without knowledge of facts would work disaster in politics or economics just as in navigation or pharmacy."¹⁴

The precise knowledge of particulars and their interpretation on the basis of their relation to the life of the whole was now the goal of Small. But "the whole" was not for him co-extensive with the universe. Unlike Ward, Small held that sociology does not embrace all possible facts about society as a part of the world. He insisted, instead, that society must be treated as an entity interdependent upon those phases of reality with which it establishes a determinable relationship. The organic view, as Small and Vincent understood it, had no reference to a "continuity of types of relationship through different orders of phenomena." It only concerned itself with those relations of interdependence which social phenomena actually display, thus making sociology (at least for the time being) "indifferent to larger generalizations in which these facts of social interdependence may have place."¹⁵

¹⁴ Small and Vincent, *op. cit.*, pp. 368-369.

¹⁵ Small and Vincent, *op. cit.*, pp. 366-367.

Small and Vincent's adherence to Schaeffle was withal implicit rather than explicit. Impressed though they were by the objectivity of the organic approach, they found in it a lack of recognition for the psychical element in human life, an element to which Ward had already called attention. Small and Vincent therefore went one step farther than Schaeffle. They added a consideration of the psychical potencies of society as an aspect of reality "which persists and constitutes the real life of the organism." Social interpretation, they said, must begin with "an analysis of these desires (motives) and must observe the conditions of their emergence."¹⁶

The importance of this modification consisted in the fact that it provided a vehicle of intercommunication in social life which the organicists, in their eager search for an objective method in approaching social function, had entirely overlooked. The principle employed by Small and Vincent, as stated, had been antedated by Ward's conception of the social forces. But in adding that human motives not only exist, as Ward had so brilliantly proved, but that they are subject to investigation, and furthermore, that the study of society is totally dependent upon the knowledge gained through their investigation (a fact which had no place in Ward's categorical system) Small and Vincent made a distinct contribution to the sociology of that day.

In the final analysis Small and Vincent's sociology was a philosophy of human welfare out of which its sponsors hoped to construct a science of sociology. They had no "system" to offer. Their book is acknowledged to be "not a report of research upon the material of social knowledge but the proposal of a method of preliminary investigation."¹⁷ The reason for this position lay in their realiza-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

tion that for an effective inquiry into the highly complex phenomena of social life a sound method was of immeasurably greater importance than superficial processes and half-baked theories resulting from them. Briefly, the method proposed by the authors consisted in the observation, discrimination, classification, and generalization upon the concrete manifestations of the social forces in human experience.

The organicists had been guilty of two errors. One was excessive emphasis on objective factors and a corresponding failure to give sufficient attention to the subjective factors in human experience; the second was a reliance upon shallow and at times highly artificial analogies between social facts and other types of facts. Small and Vincent overcame the first difficulty entirely but the second only in part. By adopting the position that society is to be viewed as an active, living something and attempting at the same time to eliminate the more obvious crudities of organismal analogy, Small and Vincent used Schaefflian doctrine in a way that left Ward far in the rear. On the other hand, by utilizing Ward's principle of psychic motivation, they made a vital improvement upon the theory of the German scholar.

Finally, by supplying a guide to research to take the place of an all-embracing cosmology of which society was only a part, Small and Vincent made the first definite step in the direction of finding out what, in fact, objective reality represents. This willingness to "look facts in the face" rather than attempt to mold their findings into predetermined forms, coupled with their earnest search for a scientific method of studying social phenomena, marks the achievement of Small and Vincent as one of great significance.

III

The year of 1905 was a pivotal year in the history of American sociology. The St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences, of which Professor Small was one of the promoters, closed in 1904, leaving the sociologists of America with a longing for a permanent sociological organization.¹⁸ If this longing was an assurance of further growth, it was not an index of inflated hopes, for the sociologists after surveying their field of work at the Congress sessions reached the modest conclusion that sociology, having begun as a "wistful advertisement of a hiatus in knowledge," to use Professor Small's favorite phrase, had been until then little more than a point of view; that it was gradually evolving into a definite method of research; and that ahead of it loomed the possibility of its becoming a science. In response to the wish for an organization, the American Sociological Society was founded. In order to take inventory of the viewpoints offered theretofore, and to indicate what type of method promised to be of constructive value, Dr. Small published his volume entitled *General Sociology*.

The book was a maturer product than either of his previous large publications. It marked, first, a definite departure from the position maintained in the *Syllabus*, for Small now held "that conduct to be moral which, in the long run and on the whole, works." It showed also a change of outlook as compared with the *Introduction to the Study of Society* in that it forsook completely the analogies of the organicists and substituted "an exhibit of sociological categories with indications of their relations to one another and their uses as tools of sociological research."¹⁹ Neither now nor at any future time did Small claim to have formulated a *system* of sociological theory.

¹⁸ For a detailed and vivid account of this event, see Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *Am. Jour. of Sociol.*, xxi:784 ff.

¹⁹ Small, "A Prospectus of Sociological Theory," *Am. Jour. of Sociol.*, xxvi:33.

General Sociology traces the development of sociology from Spencer to Ratzenhofer. Ratzenhofer's theory was obviously then accepted by Small as the final word in sociology. Still, the book could hardly be considered a treatise in historical sociology. The position assumed by Ratzenhofer had been growing up in Small's own mind for some years, as is perhaps indicated by the fact that the *Introduction* had contained much that was basic to Ratzenhofer's theory and that the German sociologist's work, *Die Soziologische Erkenntniss*, was not published until 1898. Because of this fact and Small's own testimony, it seems proper to regard Small and Ratzenhofer as independent co-discoverers of a theory in sociology in much the same way as Darwin and Wallace are regarded with reference to a theory in biology.²⁰

Central to Small's book of 1905 is his emphasis on the rôle of the group in the life of man. Small was the first American sociologist to employ the term "group" technically and with full consciousness of its meaning as a device for the interpretation of the nature of social life.²¹ The group was Small's primary object of attention. His secondary object was that constitutive and complementary

²⁰ After many years' research Darwin unexpectedly received a communication from A. R. Wallace in which the latter, a much younger man, set forth his conviction as to the manner in which species arise, which checked remarkably with that of Darwin. It is known that Darwin was so impressed that he at once announced his intention not to claim authorship of his hypothesis of natural selection. It was only with great difficulty that his friends, notably Hooker and Lyell, persuaded him to publish it over his name, and then only after they had yielded on Darwin's qualification that Wallace be mentioned as an independent co-discoverer of the biological fact in question. Small had experienced something of Darwin's fate. As he testified in his memoirs entitled "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," (*Am. Jour. of Sociol.*, xxi:818-819), Small converted his *General Sociology* into a semi-historical treatise only out of deference to Ratzenhofer whom he accidentally discovered to have arrived at the same conclusion as he himself had formed with regard to the social process.

²¹ The term "group," prior to the appearance of Small's book, was not used even in a quasi-technical sense in America. Of the Europeans, Gumplovicz and Schaeffle were the first to repudiate the unitarianism of the individual and to emphasize the value of the group in sociological analysis.

unit of analysis, the individual. The relation between the two—the group and the individual—was made clear in his statement that “it is probably nearer the truth to suppose that originally individuals were differentiations of groups than to suppose that groups were syntheses of individuals.”²²

Another important concept in his theory is that of “social forces,” already employed by Small and Vincent in their book. Small now defined social forces as the motives represented in the “countless ways in which men associating affect each other.” The social forces, he maintained, are not abstractions, not mere *a priori* assumptions referring to non-existent entities. “There are no social forces,” he said, “that lurk in the containing ether and affect persons without the agency of other persons.”

The fundamental social forces which Small induced from his observation of social life, from the pages of history, and from general literature were what he termed “interests.” These “interests” he assumed to be at once subjective and objective.²³ “There is a subjective and an objective aspect to them *all*. . . . The fact that these two senses of the term are *always* concerned, must never be ignored,” he wrote in his *General Sociology* and later reiterated many times.

²² The list of six interests given includes *health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness*, precisely as first given in the *Introduction* by Small and Vincent. This list is unlike Ratzenhofer's (Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology* and Ratzenhofer, *Soziologische Erkenntnis*, S. 54-56).

²³ The “social process” concept and the aspect of it here referred to probably came to Small and Ratzenhofer through Hegel (*Vide* Barnes, “Sociology before Comte,” *Am. Jour. of Sociol.*, xxiii:229). In fact, every effective criticism of the statical view of society took Hegelianism as its natural starting point. Hegel had historically stood sponsor for the view of society as a process of realization. His achievement consisted in restoring unity to the human understanding which Kant had so hopelessly separated into reason and reality. Hegel did not unite the subjective with the objective aspects of reality by assuming some manner of identity between them: but instead erected a system of *becoming*, wherein he showed that the formal principle of thought must become real and objective.

The human being was to him a "variation of the sixfold interests," and the conditions of human satisfaction were correspondingly variations of the selfsame interests. In this double sense the interests were considered by Small the ultimate particles to which human conduct is reducible. Interaction meant for Small invariably (a) the interaction of interests, (b) the formation of groups around interests, and (c) the formation of individuals through the interchange of influences among members in group life. This "perpetual becoming" of groups through interests and of individuals through group life was what Small called the "social process."

To call Small's theory, as some have done, a "conflict theory" is to name the whole by the part. Small's theory emphasized both conflict and co-operation. Small held that social structures satisfy certain interests. Men fostering similar interests group themselves together. They co-operate in the effort to satisfy mutual wants. Insofar, however, as men of one group or structure want something which men of another group or structure desire, conflict arises. Thus through both co-operation and conflict, on the basis of fundamental human motives, the social process goes on.

Until the appearance of Small's work the methods in vogue among sociologists consisted either in the use of limited inductive evidence or else in the employment of *a priori* conclusions. Small insisted that the social process, if it was to be approached properly, would have to be regarded as dependent upon the use of methods devoid of both these fallacies. What seemed to him necessary was, on the one hand, that concrete conditions be investigated; and on the other, that each concrete condition be so interpreted as to be located definitely in the whole social process. Practically, the method resolved itself to "the analysis of

purposes involved in the situations, to the end of arriving at generalizations of regularities and uniformities of sequence between types of social situations and types of human volitions."²⁴

The more obvious of the social forces evidenced in the associations of men Small aimed to organize under common class-names. He assumed that the forces might be observed in their manifestations, and the observations arranged in generic categories of experiences. These categories were to him more than results of research already done, more even than questions demanding answers: they were first and foremost tools for further research.

Small did not believe that his own categories were of equal weight and importance. He did not even maintain that it is "the business of every sociologist to find a job for every category" known. To him the fact that every sociologist may and does have a scale of his own merely implied that our quantitative method of analysis was far less advanced than the qualitative method. And while he did not deny the value of quantitative norms, he saw more hope in qualitative aids to social research. The first claimed the virtue of mathematical accuracy; the second, he held, possessed the greater virtue of inherent dependence upon cause and effect relationships.

IV

Latter-day critics have assailed Small's theory on the grounds that it is individualistic and subjectivistic. Despite the fact that the form of his classification of interests has obvious social reference, it has been asserted that its content is lodged in the individual consciousness with the view of making it the source of man's activities. "In other words," a critic writes, "one of the most objective of all

²⁴ Small, *General Sociology*, p. 649.

those classifications of the 'social forces' does not get away from final subjectivistic reference. Like all the others, it is finally subjectivistic and individualistic."²⁵

It is true that Small believed that real human beings could not be evaded by the analytical sociologist in his concrete investigation of human life.²⁶

The "personal equation," the individual as a simple or compound interest factor, he insisted, must form the basis upon which a sociological analysis should proceed. Yet, in doing so, he drew a sharp line of demarcation between the task of the psychologist and that of the sociologist. "To the psychologist," he wrote, "the individual is interesting as a center of knowing, feeling, and willing. To the sociologist the individual begins to be interesting when he is thought of as knowing, feeling, and willing *something*."²⁷

This *something* is what Small invariably traced to the objective environment of the person. Not individuals as self-sufficient unities was what interested Small; it was a sort of "individuals plus" that interested him. In the last analysis social reality meant to him the social process consisting of incessant interchanges of influences. It is through and because of their membership in groups that people affect one another. Since the social process is dependent alike upon the grouping of individuals and the formation of individuals through grouping, reference to the social group was with Small regularly implied in every attempt at social interpretation. Hence the group and the group-made individual as the subject matter of sociological investigation.

Could Small be adjudged subjectivistic in his reasoning? To be sure, Small never argued against the subjective aspects of thinking as such. He wrote: "I would not

²⁵ L. L. Bernard, *Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control*, p. 61; see also J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, p. 457.

²⁶ Small, *General Sociology*, p. 481.

²⁷ Small, *ibid.*, p. 431.

be understood as teaching that the subjective aspects of thinking are necessarily abnormal and vicious. There could be no thinking without thinkers."²⁸ What he objected to was the type of subjective reasoning which had all too often misled sociologists into believing that their *a-prioristic*, ready-made, assumptions necessarily tallied with reality. The objective-subjective antithesis never presented itself to Small in the same light as the macrocosm-microcosm distinction appeared to Paracelsus, or in the sense in which the internal-external difficulty appeared to Spencer. To Small objectivity in its larger sense meant only the "veracious representation of the object, so far as that representation goes."²⁹ Veracity in turn was ever conceived by Small in terms of the pragmatic ideal, which alone offers a positive criterion of analysis in all scientific procedure.

Whether, in the form in which it appeared, Small's theory will still be regarded as possessing the earmarks of the very theories which he combated with all his zeal and energy, it is difficult to say. It seems likely, however, that if the future historian of sociology will adjudge Small's theory "individualistic and subjectivistic" he will have, per necessity, to devise a new term descriptive of the kind of individualism and subjectivism which typified the work of Ward, not to say of Spencer.

The group as a tool of research, as a key to the understanding of our common life and of the human personality; the social process concept as a substitute for both the vainglorious idea of "social progress" and the vague and shiftless term "society"; and finally, the vital urge for research, for unbiased inquiry into facts as they are—these are the cornerstones of the edifice which Professor Small has built for himself. These cornerstones no critic will ever disturb.

²⁸ "Prospectus of Social Theory," *Am. Jour. of Sociol.*, xxvi:52.

²⁹ Small, *General Sociology*, p. 53.

SOME SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CULTURAL EDUCATION

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I

THE GREAT SOCIETY—all humanity—of today has for its social inheritance all the culture of the ages—barring a few items of knowledge, some primitive arts and, perhaps, some good customs that have been lost.

But the extent to which different individuals, or groups of individuals, take over and use to significant ends portions of this social inheritance varies greatly. A baby at birth has as yet shared not at all in his potential inheritance directly; but through his parents and other infant-protecting agencies he has already benefited greatly. A backwoods adult savage has assimilated extensively of his tribal culture, but has not shared greatly in that which the more advanced invaders a few leagues away have brought with them. The modern sophisticated metropolitan dweller finds accessible to him, if he desires to partake, the world's entire inheritance accumulated to date—of science, practical arts, fine arts, beliefs, customs, laws, literature. Sometimes these are in very objective form—buildings, roads, cleared lands. Often they are conserved and transmitted through records using symbols—literature, science, arts, history, laws, court decisions. More frequently still perhaps, they are carried on with little objectification or symbolic record in social conventions and customs, imitated arts, orally transmitted beliefs, and contagious attitudes.

All forms and degrees of education are designed, obviously, to assist or coerce each individual into taking on so much and such kinds, of the social inheritance—that is, the available stock of culture—as will most help him and those others who now or later will need his co-operations.

In primitive and simple societies, and especially where all the dominant valuations favor a static culture, unchanging from generation to generation, the educative transmitting processes are nearly automatic. The child, youth, or man *grows, copies, imitates* his way into his share of the common culture. Into exclusive areas of mysteries he may be consciously initiated in due course.

But in a complex social order, and especially when that social order is, as it were, ridden with whip and spur by ideals of progress, of a dynamic culture, numberless problems confront educators as to the selection of cultural elements to be transmitted to particular classes of each rising generation. Learning capacities of young persons, as well as time for learning are finite—they seem tragically so to ambitious educators. And art is long.

II

The science of educational values which we hope is now being developed needs to get on a much higher plane in regard to aim and adaptation of culture transmission than has been heretofore reached through the trial and error processes of custom evolution and biased empirical thinking. The following suggestions are submitted with a view to initiating discussion of some of the problems that such a science of educational values must consider. Let us endeavor in this analysis to keep close to the conditions finally reached in a so-called progressive American city.

1. Since the social inheritance is now so vast that any one person can hope only to possess himself of but small

portions of it, the question of first importance on his behalf is: what shall these portions be? Back of this is the question: what are the types of *use* or *functioning* that inhere in different elements of the social inheritance?

2. For adults the most obviously significant portions of the social inheritance are those involved in economic production. So far as individuals A or B are concerned, these portions function in the vocational competency of each man separately. That is, if A is to be a good carpenter, or B a good dentist, then each needs very definitely to be enabled to share in the accumulated experiences and researches of hundreds if not thousands of years in his particular field.

But, vocationally speaking, A needs none of the social inheritance that B needs, and vice versa. The economic production of the modern world is specialized into thousands of channels. The economic needs of economic communities—that is, societies that try to be largely self-sustaining—are adequately met when a sufficient number of men have well assimilated the social inheritance of carpentry, a sufficient number that of dentistry and the rest. The key problem here is determination of kinds and amounts of specialization optimum for a postulated society.

3. Then there is the social inheritance of health habits, health knowledge, health ideals. Functionally, this divides into two divisions—first, that in which every one is or should be his own doctor and sanitarian; and, second, that in which we buy specialist service, much as we buy music or books. For each type every individual needs some education.

4. We are all obliged to be conformists to established political order, and in democracies most of us adults are expected to co-operate in sustaining that order. Here

general assimilation of an extensive social inheritance of moral and civic customs, techniques of co-operative governing, and ideals of "liberty within the law" is essential to any solid society, but our educational programs for this purpose are as yet very vague. Here educators most need help from the social scientists.

5. The selection and educational transmission of the religious inheritance may prove to be too complex a problem for educational science for a long period—or until scientists can determine standards of valid functioning for the several kinds of elements in that enormous area of beliefs, rituals, taboos, and prized attitudes generally.

III

Having set apart the foregoing areas of culture, sociologically considered, there remain for more critical examination certain areas with which popular usage commonly associates the terms "culture" and "cultured." We speak of "a cultured voice," of "a cultured taste for reading," of dressing "in good taste," of "high-brow culture," and of the "vulgarity of the newly rich." We ask: "do manual laborers really desire culture?"; "is Chicago a cultural city?"; "does the American (liberal) college really produce culture in its students?"; and "why are Americans so backward in musical culture?"

The kinds of culture or the elements of the social inheritance referred to, at least by implication, in the foregoing statements are usually of a non-utilitarian character, as that term is commonly used. They seem to involve certain of these "higher" or "finer" things of life which are not directly, or at least visibly, related to earning a living, keeping one's health, sharing in government, or worshipping deities.

Furthermore, a closer examination than educators usually give to these implications will show that to a very large extent the qualities evaluated represent, not *producers' powers*, but *utilizers' appreciations*. "Good taste in dress" need connote no ability whatever in making dresses or neckties. "A cultured taste for poetry" is expected, not from poets, but from patrons and readers of poets. In order that Gopher Prairie should be a cultured town as respects music, architecture or photodrama it is not at all necessary that there should be there resident composers of music, concert singers, architects, or moving picture producers.

It might seem that "cultured speech," "cultured manners," "refined social behavior" and "proper etiquette" (by which is implied always superior or special brands of these qualities, since all persons have them of some degree and kind) represent in fact "performance" rather than "appreciational" powers. That may be true in their final rôles. But consider their origins in individuals, refusing to be misled by the snobbery actually exhibited by the statement "he has no culture." We all have speech, manners, and the rest. But at some stage the "cultured" person induced or preferred to choose this rather than that—or to elect what by some current valuations was a "superior" brand or species.

Perhaps the variety of cultural appreciation selected to become habitual as expression cost more effort or time or other sacrifice. Often, however, in past history it has been readily acquired by those "to the manor born," because of the absence of conflicting suggestions. But even here it is the fruit of "utilizers' appreciations" far more than of conscious and effortful training in performance powers.

The range of "cultural appreciations" of the supposedly non-utilitarian character here suggested is so vast that classifications are essential to any worth-while description.

Among those appreciational assimilations of the social inheritance not visibly functional in vocational performance, civic and moral behavior, religious observance, and health conservation, we find vast ranges from the visibly sumptuary to the spiritually exalted. Gustatory and olfactory tastes, preferences for bodily ease and warmth, choices of companions for sociability, addictions to personal decoration, satisfactions in recreational reading or games, and the like seem to us to belong to relatively "low" orders of non-utilitarian culture levels. On the other hand insistent preferences for, and constant discriminations in favor of, "good" music, high-class literature, scientific interpretations, classical painting, ennobling companionship, "refined" personal adornments, are often regarded as of a "high," "elevating," or "spiritually enriching" order. The first or "common" group of appreciations will here be called "euthenic;" and the second, the "spirital" (not spiritual).

IV

Why should education seek to promote "spirital" varieties of culture? What are the "social values" of so-called superior tastes in music, graphic art, literature, and understanding of science which actually should justify the collective efforts of large numbers of leaders in all progressive societies towards having the rising generations assimilate these things in greater degree than their fathers?

To these questions many answers are given in terms of aspirations, beliefs, dogmas, and the other mechanisms of hope and faith as used by individual partisans and by promotional cults. But from scientific knowledge it is here contended that no acceptable answers are yet forth-coming. That there are values here, at least under some conditions, none of us would deny. But it is highly probable that if

we knew more than we do of individual and social psychology we should find many and grotesque errors in prevailing applications of the personal or customary valuations of leaders of the several varieties and degrees of spiritual appreciations.

For example, all persons like music. But many seem amply satisfied with "low-brow" or popular kinds. Even strenuous training seems futile to make more than a minority care for "superior" music. What are the losses to the "low-brows" personally? To their social groups through them? These questions point the way to a veritable jungle of confused sentiments, traditions, and snobberies that might well repel any investigator.

We can at least begin our exploration by recognizing kinds and degrees of spiritual culture beyond those implied in current language of promotion. It is sociologically and therefore scientifically true, of course, that there are no adults in America today who are without literary culture. All Americans (omitting the babies) have some musical and plastic art culture. In a very true sense, any one of ten million American farmers is today far more scientifically cultured (quite apart from the requirements of his vocation) than could have been one of the best schooled men of the seventh century A. D.

All Americans have manners. None have "perfect" manners, perhaps (to determine that we should require standards and "base levels"). They differ greatly as respects kinds and degrees of particular species of manners. We can profitably try to describe a particular species or degree and then evaluate it in terms of defect, shortage, excess, admirable example.

Let us not assume that Gopher Prairie is "without culture." Such "all-or-none" judgments have small place in the social sciences. The total spiritual culture of Gopher

Prairie consists now in fact of many kinds represented in different degrees among some hundreds of greatly unlike individuals. Perhaps, as Van Loon contends, the manual workers don't want Carol Kennicott's brands of culture in literature and interior decoration at any price or from any source. Perhaps it can be proven that through some easily corrected failure of effort not enough education has been devoted towards producing "elevated" tastes in magazine reading. These matters are all susceptible of scientific examination—provided we keep our feet feeling for the solid ground of "social values" all the time.

SANITY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*

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PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY is as old as sociology itself. It had its modern origins with Spinoza, Hume, and Adam Smith. Beginning approximately with the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a new spurt exemplified by the works of Bagehot, Tarde, Durkheim, Fouilleé, Le Bon, Sighele, Ross and others. These writers dealt with rather general and vague processes such as custom, fashion, imitation, crazes, social impression, crowd psychology informally interpreted, sympathy and emulation. There was little reliable technical psychology to be learned at that time, and but few of these writers were acquainted with even the modicum which was available. The works of this period were popular, informal and descriptive. Giddings and Cooley showed more knowledge of professional psychology than the writers mentioned above, with the exception of Durkheim, but it may safely be said that Professor C. A. Ellwood was the first author to produce a work on psychological sociology which proved that the writer possessed a respectable acquaintance with, and a firm grip upon, the science of psychology. His *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, published in 1912, was the first treatise on psychological sociology truly worthy of the name in any technical sense.

* EDITORIAL NOTE: In this discussion of Professor C. A. Ellwood's contributions to social psychology, special attention is given to Dr. Ellwood's recent work, entitled, *The Psychology of Human Society*.

While Ellwood took his doctor's degree in sociology under Albion W. Small, his specific professional interests have been relatively little influenced by his master. About the only trace of Small's teaching has been an ardent interest in social reform and a catholicity of outlook upon sociological literature. At Chicago Ellwood was affected by his readings and studies in philosophy and psychology far more than by the lectures in formal sociology. From a reading of James and the teachings of Dewey and Meade he derived his interest in functional psychology. Dewey's instrumentalism and theory of cultural determinism profoundly influenced him, as well as Dewey's belief in democracy and his faith in the social efficacy of a rational system of education. Of his sociology teachers W. I. Thomas, who was primarily interested at this time in ethnic and social psychology, was the most stimulating and helpful. Beyond his Chicago teachers Ellwood's thought has been shaped chiefly by Baldwin, Cooley, Hobhouse and the Boas school of anthropologists. From Baldwin and Cooley he derived his conviction of the futility of any effort to discuss the individual apart from his group, and from Cooley and Hobhouse he received the emphasis upon the organic or synthetic view of human society and the necessity of the proper co-ordination and harmonious adjustment of the institutions of society. From the Boas school of anthropologists he obtained a clearer and more adequate view of cultural determinism and the laws of cultural evolution.

Professor Ellwood's major interest has always been in psychological sociology, though he has also shown a commendable interest in criminology and cultural anthropology. His doctoral dissertation was entitled *Some Prolegomena to Social Psychology*. His systematic work published in 1912 has already been mentioned in giving it its

proper place in the history of the literature on the subject. In 1917 he attempted a somewhat briefer and more popular work entitled *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. The present work must not be viewed as merely a revision of either of his earlier works in the field. It is a new book. Yet there are no revolutionary changes in the general framework of his system of psychological sociology. The organization of the book differs from *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* and there is much new material forced by the progress of psychology and social science in the last fifteen years, particularly with respect to the instinct controversy. At the same time, one who expects to find in the book an anthology of the most up-to-date and controversial aspects of psychological sociology will be disappointed. Ellwood confessedly shies off from the social applications of Freudism and the more extreme versions of behaviorism. One is to be pardoned, however, for unwillingness to adopt debatable or controversial hypotheses. Yet one should be as wary of debatable anachronisms as of debatable innovations, and it is scarcely unfair to hold that the theory of imitation and the intellectualism espoused in the book are as dubious as the attenuated Freudianism exploited by Professor Allport.

We may now briefly summarize the outstanding positions adopted by Professor Ellwood in this sane and comprehensive book. He does not lay as much emphasis upon the distinction between social psychology and psychological sociology. It is apparent by implication, however, that the present book is to be defined as psychological sociology, because of the attitude taken towards the group, which the author regards as the unit of investigation in the field of the psychology of human society.

Ellwood is a thorough-going evolutionist in his recognition of the biological origins of man and the physical fac-

tors lying back of the origins of human groups. He makes it clear that human groups first took form as a result of collective effort to meet more effectively the strictly physical requirements of food, sex and self-preservation. He also recognizes the biological background of human behavior in the so-called instincts, but he does not view instincts in the manner of McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology*. Instead of a very few definite instincts producing rigid compulsions to act in certain ways, man inherits a vast number of potential "reaction tendencies." How these will emerge in actual conduct will, however, be determined by social conditioning. Here the author is in agreement with Watson's basic thesis, but he does not exploit the theory of the conditioned-reflex as fully as one might wish.

This view of instincts, which appears to the reviewer to be the sound and correct one, leads to a conception of human nature as almost indefinitely plastic, though it does not follow that all types of conditioning are equally desirable or compatible with the physical well-being and social adjustment of man. But it does prove the grotesque fallacy in the view of the arch conservative or the ultra-dogmatic biological determinist that we can expect no significant improvement in social institutions because of the inflexible and recalcitrant character of human nature.

Race distinctions on a physical basis have little significance as regards mental capacity or social conditioning. They are insignificant, as compared to the differences in innate capacity between members of the same so-called race and they yield promptly to the influence of culture. Further, both the biological nature of man and the special physical facts of race are relatively static and unchanging factors in the social process and social evolution, having altered little if any since prehistoric times, while culture is

the dynamic element in the drama of history and civilization-building. Therefore, Ellwood concludes that while we cannot ignore the biological factors, such as the original nature of man, individual differences in innate ability between members of the same group, and racial distinctions, still all of these are of secondary importance when compared with the cultural traits and social institutions that surround man from birth to the grave.

Ellwood adopts the functional view of psychology, namely, that it is the task of the human mind to select the forms of reactions and behavior which produce the most effective adjustment of man and the group to the surrounding environment. The culture of the group is the accumulated result of the increasingly purposeful choice of activities to achieve this task of adaptation. A major problem is to extend this element of conscious purposeful activity to the degree of making an intelligent effort at social improvement.

This brings the author to a consideration of social change. There are two types: (1) normal, or free and unimpeded modification of group mores and institutions due to the operation of a multitude of factors; and (2) abnormal, or revolutionary transformations of group culture and social institutions resulting from the obstruction of natural social change. Hitherto the normal type of social change has been for the most part effected by unconsciously operating factors, but Ellwood, following Ward and Hobhouse, looks forward to the time when the processes of social transformation will be made subject to conscious and scientific intellectual guidance. Ellwood's treatment of revolution is sane and stimulating, he having been one of the first to discuss the psychology of revolutions. He interprets revolution as a revolt against stupid and long continued repression, as destructive in its results,

but often the only alternative to a continuance of intolerable oppression. He makes some use of Sorokin's interpretation of the psychology of revolutions, but does not sufficiently emphasize the fact that the clue to Sorokin's view is the behavioristic conception of the conditioned-reflex and conditioned behavior. Ellwood easily demonstrated that liberalism is the best preventive of revolution, and the repression of freedom the surest method of making revolution inevitable.

Ellwood's view of social change illustrates the very great emphasis which he lays upon the rôle of intelligence in social organization and social change. He does not, however, ignore the importance of feeling, quoting with approval John Dewey's statement that "the separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy of our present human world." If one were to compare his book with Lippman's *Phantom Public* or Eldridge's *Political Action* he might feel that in his attitude toward the rôle of intelligence and social will Professor Ellwood has mistaken what ought to be for what is. Yet we can all applaud his noble plea for the increasing power of discriminating intelligence as created by an ever more adequate type of education. Ellwood is also a thorough believer in the concept and reality of social progress, though by no means naïve in his optimism. Here, again, devotees of Spengler or Dean Inge would file a *caveat*, but we hope Ellwood is right.

Likewise, in his view of religion as projected social idealism, Ellwood has been accused by some of having substituted wish-fulfilment for historical and social realism. Yet, if one examines the text closely he will find that Ellwood's emphasis upon religion, which justly attracted so much attention upon the publication of *The Reconstruction of Religion*, will afford but slight comfort or satisfaction to

the adherents of organized Christianity in the twentieth century. The only question which occurs to the reviewer is as to whether it would not be better to discover some other term than religion to designate Professor Ellwood's wholly commendable social idealism, resting as it does upon a thorough acceptance of the facts of modern science. Certainly, in a new religious system such as Professor Ellwood projects, James Harvey Robinson, John Dewey, H. G. Wells or Professor Ellwood himself would be far more appropriate candidates for the papacy than, not only John Roach Straton or Cardinal Hayes, but even Harry Emerson Fosdick or Shailer Matthews. The only organizations which now exist that would approximately meet the conditions he lays down are John Haynes Holmes' Community Church or Felix Adler's Ethical Culture Society, and we have not been informed of any recent plans for tearing down these structures and building greater.

In conclusion, one may be urged to read Professor Ellwood's manual as a sane and balanced treatment of generally sound doctrine. If it is not a message from the firing-line it is an admirable compendium and assessment of the last campaign.

INTERPRETING SOCIAL PROCESSES

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THE WORK of the early sociologists consisted largely of efforts to establish the concept of sociology and to prove the right of sociology to membership in the family of social sciences.¹ Sociologists have been largely interested in defining the scope and boundaries of their field of study. Certain groups of them have been concerned primarily in straightening out some specific kink in the chain of human events; in easing some especially irritating, chafing spot in the social structure. We are, however, entering a period in which the necessity of proving the right to exist is no longer the chief burden of our efforts. Our problem is rather on the one hand, that of explaining the causes which are dominant factors in determining social activities, and on the other hand the evaluation and comparison of the social processes within the social structure.

We are approaching a time when the chief interest of a considerable group of sociologists will consist, not in defining social forces, tendencies, activities, and processes, but rather in measuring and comparing the social processes which constitute the life of society. We are beginning to see many promising attempts to measure by means of objective standards, the relative status of social activities in different groups, as well as the interrelationship of activities within the same group. In short certain groups of sociologists are beginning to say: the function of the

¹ *American Encyclopedia*, p. 208.

sociologist is more than defining terms, explaining structure and concepts. He must evaluate and compare in objective terms the social processes.² As stated by Hayes,³ "The social process is composed of all the activities that go on in association. . . . It includes ideas, sentiments, and practices which are not peculiar to any one individual but prevalent among many."

Shrugging our shoulders, changing the subject of discussion, quibbling over the content or the interpretation of an abstract term will soon cease to be an effective means of avoiding the responsibility of answering a straightforward question, which people have a right to ask the sociologists to solve. Either the sociologist or someone else is going to explain, evaluate, measure social activities and processes in definite, comparable, objective terms, rather than in terms of a point of view.

True, it is easier to sit back in a comfortable arm chair, light up one's pipe, and speculate on the merits of particular social activities and their interrelationship, or the effect of particular group activities upon the social processes. However, not only has that method outlived its usefulness, but objective standards of evaluation can be devised and applied with a considerable degree of accuracy. Tendencies may be explained in terms capable of comparison, even though not yet done to the degree of accuracy with which we can compare variations in the diameter of strands of wire.

² "When we use the term 'process' in sociology, and especially when we say that the human lot is a process, or a process of processes, we mean simply that the human lot is made up of incessant interchanges of influences of which people, through their membership in groups, are both the active and the passive transmitters. Of what sort, and how many these influences are, what are their ways of reacting one upon another, what results from the reactions which are not visible in the organized influences themselves,—such questions as these set the tasks for Sociology."—A. W. Small, *Origin of Sociology*, p. 23, 1924.

³ E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, p. 303.

"What have you accomplished in the work of your neighborhood house during the past ten years?" was a question put to a settlement house resident. "We have had, each year, an average of — thousand contacts in our game room, — thousand contacts in our gym classes, our mother clubs, our group meetings, and, . . .". for a short time more of the above was quoted to show what was being done.

"But what has been the value of these activities? What changes have been wrought in the community because of your activities? In what measure have you functioned in the social processes of this community?"

He looked at me quizzically. "Why—why, I don't believe you understand about the work of the neighborhood house. The work done cannot be measured like the product of a factory—we deal in spiritual values. Our social contacts affect the very life processes of the social group—they are intangible—unmeasurable."

That was the answer given me to the type of question which any person should expect to have answered by an agency expending large sums of money in carrying on their work in a limited area.

"I want \$50,000 to carry on my work among boys," said a boys' worker. . . . "Is the work you do worth \$50,000? Is it more beneficial for the community to spend \$50,000 in boys' club activities than in doing something else with that money? Will the boys and the community be benefited more than they will be discommoded by that use of the \$50,000?" The boys' worker was insulted. "I cannot understand," he said, "how you—a sociologist, can ask such a question. The value of boys' club activities *cannot be measured*. There is an intangible spiritual value there. It is part of a great complicated *process*, but we know its value is of utmost importance."

The social processes to which the activities of particular groups contribute (such as the Settlement House or Boys' Club organization), are represented by the ideas, sentiments, attitudes and practices. The fact, however, that the social processes which make up the group activities of the community are in the nature of psychic factors, does not preclude their interpretation, or evaluation, with a degree of objective accurateness that will permit of measurement and comparison.

The Boys' Club leader has as his objective the development of ideas, sentiments, attitudes, and practices which either did not exist, or if they did exist were ineffective, unstandardized, and not functioning within the group of boys in which he is interested. He is likewise concerned in the development of ideas, desires, sentiments, attitudes, and practices which will serve to counteract factors which he believes to be of a detrimental nature. He questions, however, the possibility of objectively interpreting the results of his efforts.

The Settlement worker is attempting to help establish recognized standards of behavior, attitudes, ideas, ideals, approvals, disapprovals, sentiments, and practices, but doubts whether the social processes can be interpreted. It seems impossible to him, because the method is different than discovering the amount of copper or tungsten in a lump of gold.

As was stated above, the social processes are intangible and consist of the interaction of the ideas, sentiments, and practices of social groups. You cannot count a process, or measure it with a foot rule. Because of that fact, it is assumed by many that it cannot be interpreted in objective terms. The "spiritual values" of the boys' clubs must be measured in terms of their functioning.⁴ To what extent,

⁴ M. C. Elmer, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXX, No. 2.

or in what way have the social processes within the group been changed by the injection of that particular activity? In what specific way and to what extent have the ideas, sentiments, and practices of a group of boys changed, as a result of the boys' club activities among them? What things are now done in a settlement neighborhood which were not done before its activities were carried on? In what specific ways do the ideas, sentiments, and practices of a group of people change, who have had their "life processes" influenced by settlement activities?

There is no single method which can be applied to interpretation of social processes. Instead it must be a combination of several methods. It must include an approach such as suggested by the study of Polish peasants.⁵ It must include a study of attitudes as illustrated by the Race Relation Survey on the Pacific Coast.⁶ It must include a statistical study of objective factors which can be enumerated for study in order to obtain the actual changes which have occurred. The presence or absence of any additional factors will be observed in the *resultant* phenomena.⁷ These changes can be observed and studied, and constitute the factors which give us a basis for interpreting the social processes. When we bring together the different techniques and methods which are being perfected, and apply them to the intensive study of particular group activities, we can give the settlement worker and the boys' club worker a definite measuring stick, by which he can determine with a reasonable degree of accurateness the "spiritual value" and the change in ideas, sentiments, and practices which make up the social processes within his field of endeavor.

⁵ Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919.

⁶ E. S. Bogardus, *The New Social Research*, 1926.

⁷ M. C. Elmer, *Social Statistics: Statistical Methods applied to Sociology*, pp. 64, 152, 1926.

A SIMPLE GRAPH FOR THREE QUANTITIES

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A STUDENT sometimes wishes to depict the interrelation of three variables. The use of surfaces and solids is often undesirable, because an observer may misjudge the significance of areas and volumes. When the relation is expressed by $z = x + y$, triangular co-ordinates serve the purpose.

It is frequently preferable to show all quantities on the same scale. In this case equilateral axes are useful. A trial sketch comprising more than the scope needed may be drawn, and the portion including the curves can be blocked out.

The graph herewith shows the application of this means for analyzing the factors in growth of Swedish rural and urban population from 1821 to 1920. The table presents the data on rates from the *Statistical Year Book* of 1922. The curves indicate the trend of all these quantities.


MEAN ANNUAL RATE PER 1000 POP.*										
PERIOD	BIRTHS		DEATHS		GENETIC		MIGRATION		INCREASE	
	RUR.	URB.	R.	U.	R.	U.	R.	U.	R.	U.
1821-30	34.97	31.64	22.41	34.66	12.56	-3.02	-1.41	12.92	11.15	9.90
1831-40	31.72	29.14	21.62	33.67	10.10	-4.53	-1.73	12.36	8.37	7.83
1841-50	31.28	29.39	19.69	28.83	11.59	0.56	-1.67	14.16	9.92	14.72
1851-60	32.81	32.56	20.97	31.22	12.24	1.34	-3.21	20.29	9.03	21.63
1861-70	31.19	32.95	19.33	26.17	11.86	6.78	-6.18	14.49	5.68	21.27
1871-80	30.21	32.13	17.32	24.05	12.89	8.08	-6.35	16.32	6.54	24.40
1881-90	28.65	31.07	16.36	19.74	12.29	11.33	-12.03	14.89	0.26	26.22
1891-00	27.16	27.07	16.11	17.37	11.05	9.70	-7.32	10.96	3.73	20.66
1901-10	25.74	25.87	14.89	14.89	10.85	10.98	-7.85	10.46	3.00	21.44
1911-20	22.68	20.51	14.60	13.44	8.08	7.07	-7.92	16.88	0.16	23.95

* Statistisk Årsbok, 1922, p. 33.

POPULATION MOVEMENT

SWEDISH RATES 1821-1920

RURAL TREND ← URBAN →



The arching branches in the left triangle bring out the marked decrease in death rates, the less notable fall in birth rates, and make evident the function of each in the swinging rates of genetic increase. The opposed fishhooks in the right triangle display the comparative importance of this last composite factor, in connection with accelerating and retarding tendencies of migration. Both sides of the figure convey an integrated impression of the relative movement of rural and urban population, which columns of figures fail to impart.

Such charts are capable of widely extended use. When data permit, any of three factors may be further analyzed by unfolding a new triangle from the base to be resolved. For instance, "Migration" in our example, might be distributed according to separate indexes for immigration and emigration. In this way many composite quantities may be subdivided and reassembled according to a simple

pattern. The partial correlation of six factors of the form $a + b = c + d + e + f$ is nearly expressed by unfolding three wings like the sides of a tetrahedron. It is beyond the purpose of this note to discuss further implications.

A word may be added in conclusion regarding relations of three variables involving multiplication or division of one by a second to produce the third, as in the case of *population* \div *area* = *density*. Here triangular co-ordinates at logarithmic intervals manifestly give the desired scales. For illustrations of the application of this familiar principle, the reader is referred to the writer's article on "The Limit of American Population" in *Social Forces* for September, 1925.

METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

CLARENCE MARSH CASE

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IN THE normal run of things it would not seem necessary to give special notice in a sociological journal to a book on "Theory of History" by an erstwhile professor of history.¹ But the volume in question is very far from being exclusively a treatise on history; it is really a bold indictment of both history and the several social sciences, sociology included, dealing critically with their methods and results. In fact, it amounts to a challenge to sociology, delivered with such outstanding ability, seriousness, yet with such inadequacy withal, that it cannot well be ignored.

The author starts out with the premise that two centuries of effort have failed to produce a really "scientific" study of "human society," and he essays to point out a new (?) course of procedure in the social sciences which will lead to that long-delayed goal.

The book referred to, which is of very high order so far as keen, logical discussion and high scholarship are concerned, is divided into three parts. In Part I, called "The Study of Events," Professor Teggart deals with the activities, aims, and logical implications of historical narration (historiography). In this field, his own familiar ground, his thought is distinctly brilliant and convincing. In Part II, dealing, under the general title "The Study of Change," with the study of evolution in the biological and social sci-

¹ *Theory of History*, by Frederick J. Teggart. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1925, pp. xix+223.

ences, he remains instructive and suggestive. In Part III he attempts to outline his proposed method for "The Study of the Present." In this portion of the essay the author's apparent lack of acquaintance with the recent trend of sociology is really fatal to his purpose. In order to see if the above characterization is correct, let me summarize as as briefly as possible his profound and closely woven argument.

I. THE STUDY OF EVENTS

Professor Teggart finds the greatest obstacle in the way of a truly scientific study of man in the fact that historians have always been essentially historiographers, or writers of history! They may talk of "scientific history," and may use with painstaking care all the rigidly exact methods of natural science in their collecting, verification, and analysis of "documents,"—but when they turn to write out the results of their researches they cease to be scientists in any sense of the word and become simply *artists*. One might say that there is no hope, scientifically speaking, for the historian, until he washes his hands, or his pen, of historiography.

But happily, as our author admits, the historian is not compelled to become "scientific" in order to gain or maintain academic dignity. All he has to do is to cease talking about "scientific" history, and to recognize that history-writing is an *art*, and that it produces simply *literature*. It is, to be sure, interesting and valuable literature, but literature none the less, and nothing more. All this results from the fact that the historian starts out to tell "what happened." As the basis for this he collects "documents." The documents fall short, necessarily, of recording *all* that happened. The historian has, therefore, to make selection and to fill in the gaps between his evidences.

In so filling in he is guided by his preconceived interest, which is shown in the very fact that he set out to write the history of that particular happening, person, institution, nation, or world.

Moreover, the historiographer fills in the gaps between his "documents" with "motives," that is, with hypothetical psychological elements which he imputes to the actors. The result is a synthesis, a whole, an impressionistic picture—in short a genuine work of art. Now, let the historian simply recognize this situation, stop talking about "scientific history" (an impossibility), accept his true rôle of *artist*, and all will be well with him. But we shall have to look elsewhere to find the really *scientific* student of human society. He will not be an historiographer, but he will use historical materials.

II. THE STUDY OF CHANGE

Logicians early perceived that whereas history studies "events," i. e., the uncommon and unique, natural science examines "conditions" and relations of *things*. But, strange to say, history ignores the gradual changes, i. e., "processes," which lead up to its events. And science has committed the opposite error in trying to study the *dateless processes* of gradual modification in complete separation from events.

For historical reasons ably set forth by Professor Teggart, it came to be accepted in eighteenth century thinking that there is a law of natural, insensibly gradual, and endless progress inherent in things. Consequently, in the early evolutionary study of nature and man, *events* came to be ruled out as "unnatural disturbances" of this progressive movement toward perfection. Next, comparisons were made between modern nations and their own past stages

on one hand, and between them and existing savages on the other. In so doing stress was laid on "similarities," and "an astonishing uniformity" was enunciated. The conclusion was thus reached that modern nations had emerged gradually from those earlier stages. In attempting to picture the course of this development they filled in an ideal, generalized series of stages never actually existent anywhere, but which all peoples were believed to have traversed automatically under the universal "law" of natural progress.

Auguste Comte, usually accepted as the "father of modern sociology," completely adopted and popularized this comparative method. He arranged existing and earlier societies in an ideal series, with the modern European groups at the top. In so doing the "events" emphasized by academic historians were deemed "essentially insignificant," and comparable to "monstrosities" in biology.

Comte thus widened the gap between the methods pursued by history and science respectively. "While historians have concentrated attention on the study of situations and events," remarks Professor Teggart, "anthropologists have concerned themselves primarily with the study of conditions and of change" (p. 105).

Darwin made the matter worse by advocating, even when facts of the geological record were apparently to the contrary, that "Nature never makes a leap." Darwinians, despite the warnings of Huxley, clung to the view that "Nature in the course of time, moves only by slow, gradual steps, by slight, successive transitions" (p. 134).

Nevertheless, Professor Teggart points out, "evolutionary study cannot be successfully carried on without recognition of the fact that change, if it occurs, must take place under specific conditions and within definite limits of time and space" (p. 138). This will introduce some-

thing of a historical character into the methods of natural science; and at the same time the historian has to learn from evolutionary study by recognizing the slow gradual processes of change which lead up to and affect the events which he portrays.

III. THE STUDY OF THE PRESENT

This part opens with a chapter on "the method of science," expounding well-known principles, from which the author concludes that "the line of development in each field of science has been from the observational study of phenomena to the analysis of the observed phenomena in terms of processes" (p. 158). Some sciences, of which chemistry is the type, "seek to discover the forms and modes of action of the *constituent elements* of which things are made up, whereas zoology is an example of the sciences which are occupied in the endeavor to find out *how things have come to be as they are*. The unifying element in these types of inquiry is the common aim of determining how things work" (p. 164).

Therefore, the author holds, the only way to escape from the hitherto prevailing absorption in one or the other aspect of *change*, which in itself includes both processes and events, will be to return to the present, from which all scientific investigation must of necessity set out," and take for the aim of the natural and social sciences (both necessarily historical) the endeavor to learn "how things have come to be as they are." The initial step will be "the acquisition of an extensive body of information in regard to the geographical distribution of human activities, spoken of, collectively, as 'human culture.' Geography, therefore, must provide the foundation for humanistic inquiry" (p. 171).

We thus reach the culmination of the entire book in the chapter entitled "The Method of Hume and Turgot." Here Professor Teggart proposes a method for the social sciences which he arrived at independently, but found expressed in the earlier writings of the two essayists for whom he names the chapter. It is therefore of extraordinary interest, in view of the fact that the author started out with the explicitly declared intention of pointing out a new path, by which the social sciences, so-called, may become really scientific in method. Hume, argues Professor Teggart, first pointed toward this true way by showing, in his inquiry as to why one nation differs from another, that the situations that must be studied are, *first*, that of fixity, sameness, and *stability* in society; *second*, *modification* of group-life, by means of social intercourse, importation of arts, etc.; *third*, drastic *interruptions* of a given established order. Turgot, in similar vein, showed, *first*, that man in isolated groups, without commerce, is everywhere in the same condition of barbarism, wherein the *status quo* is maintained by despotism, and, later, by controlled education; *second*, this culture comes to be *modified* by commerce and social intercourse; *third*, such changes are due solely to the *disruptive* effect of migrations, wars, and conquests.

The type of inquiry thus indicated by Hume and Turgot was not followed up in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, being overshadowed by the notion of gradual, necessary *progress*. However, about the middle of the nineteenth century there was added the perception that the elucidation of the present by a study of "how things came to be as they are" requires the examination of *differences* no less than *similarities*. This calls for detailed studies of particular areas and cultures, while this in turn makes necessary a comparative study of group-

histories, especially stressing *intrusions*, among which *migrations* are held by Professor Teggart to represent the type.

This is the method which Professor Teggart enunciates as new, and the only way of scientific salvation for the social sciences. Its inadequacy for such an ambitious rôle, remarked at the outset of this review, is evident in the fact that it is not new to the social sciences at large, and within the field of sociology it has been more or less faithfully pursued for several decades already. No recognition is made of these facts. Presumably the real condition of present-day sociology is not known to our author and proposed guide. While the book is heavily documented throughout, especially touching history, historical method, and philosophy, he devotes a bare twenty-one lines to his summary of the recent "activities of economists and sociologists" combined" (p. 220). In so doing a phrase of six words is quoted from a book on the *Origins of Sociology* (presumably Small's), but even in this solitary quotation neither the page nor the author is named.

Under such circumstances it is not strange that he should refer to the sociologists as "committed to some theory of the original nature of man" (p. 178), when precisely the contrary is the case. One needs only to mention the work of Cooley, Park and Burgess, and point to Ellwood, who has repeatedly affirmed that human nature is one of the most modifiable factors we have to deal with. If this be taken as itself a theory of human nature, it should be noted that he is at least looking toward the present and the future rather than dogmatizing about the past. And in so doing he has the tacit endorsement of his colleagues, so far as I have observed.

Since Professor Teggart has omitted recent sociology it becomes necessary, in order to estimate the value of his

proposal, to make very brief mention of the fact that the study of *processes* has been extensively studied in varying ways and degrees by Ross, Simmel, Cooley, Park and Burgess, and Thomas, as well as by many others. In fact the very procedure advocated by Professor Teggart has come, within the last decade or two, to constitute the characteristic method of sociological research. Ross has thirty or more chapters in his *Principles*, each treating a social process, with heavy reliance upon historical evidence. Simmel's "forms of socialization" are social processes under another name. Small and Cooley have studied the process concept in its more comprehensive aspect, while Thomas has finely illuminated the process of *disorganization*, particularly in the Polish peasant family. Park and Burgess, in addition to their own individual studies of socialization, culture conflicts, etc., have produced an epoch-making text-book which is largely devoted to the elucidation of fundamental social processes.

Thus it is plain that contemporary sociologists have already become much at home in the intensive study of social processes. Moreover, they have not overlooked the study of "events," nor their rôle in breaking up the fixed routine of uniform, dateless processes. Ward, the pioneer of American sociologists, emphasized the social effects of conquest and subjugation in 1903, and as far back as 1883 he explicitly and completely anticipated (in *Dynamic Sociology*) Professor Teggart's final conclusion (p. 222) that "the difficulty (about the idea of progress as natural) will, in large measure, be resolved if we recognize the difference between a *belief in progress* and a *belief in the possibility of progress*," which latter will be realized only when we understand that "the activities of men must be directed by knowledge." This is precisely the central thesis of Ward's earlier work, and of his later treatise, *Applied Sociology*.

In addition, on the matter of intrusive events that break up routinary processes, we have, among other things, the work of Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer, with the other "Conflict" sociologists, as Bogardus has termed them.² And in this connection the early essays of Ross, collected in his *Foundations of Sociology*, are highly important—among others his extensive papers on "Factors of Social Change."

The above titles represent only a few examples, picked up at random in passing, but they seem to show that sociology, with all its faults, which I am very far from denying, has at least arrived ahead of Professor Teggart with respect to this method of investigation.

One is left wondering just what Professor Teggart's new method actually is after all. Fortunately he refers us to his earlier work, *The Processes of History*,³ for a tentative exemplification.

This excellent little volume undertakes to trace the process by which kindred organization has been displaced by political, territorial organization, in various parts of the world. This transition, he finds, has been forced upon men "at certain geographical points" (p. 85). The impelling force is invasion, and the movements of population behind this are due, not so much to expansion of population as to shrinkage of subsistence caused by climatic changes. The causal series is, therefore, one of climatic change, food-scarcity, migration, invasion, and subjugation. But this chain of causation merely leads up to the essential *process*, which is identified by Professor Teggart in the explicit statement that "the cardinal point is that the conflict, in breaking up the older (tribal) organization, liberated the individual man, if but for the moment, from

² In Chapter XX of *History of Social Thought*, 1922.

³ Yale University Press, New Haven, 1918.

the dominance of the group, its observances, its formulae, and its ideas" (p. 86).

This is the identical process called "individualization" by Ross, who published a chapter under that caption in the *American Journal of Sociology*, for January, 1920.⁴ In this particular instance Professor Teggart's thought, if not anticipated, was simultaneously matched, as the following shows: "The processes which pulverize social lumps and release the action of their members may be termed *individuation*."⁵ But whereas Professor Teggart discovers the process in its most general aspect as a formula of world history, Ross expounds and illustrates it under numerous aspects and with minute historical evidence.

Without belaboring the argument, perhaps enough has been said to warrant the conclusion that Professor Teggart's challenge to sociology turns out to be a challenge to himself to take note of recent work in that field, and to follow his present essay with a further statement, showing exactly in what way and degree his proposed method of investigation differs from the current practice of American sociologists. At this writing the distinction is far from evident. Indeed, candor compels me to say that his sample study is correctly named when it calls itself "Processes of *History*." In so far as it is anything essentially different from *philosophy* of history, it duplicates those broad generalizations about societies at large which were produced during the earlier days of sociology. It is clear that Professor Teggart has seceded from *history*, and burned his bridges behind him, but he has not yet pushed his studies to the point attained by sociologists of standing. With his fearless thinking and splendid erudition he might greatly enrich our field; but as he himself remarks, "every compe-

⁴ It constitutes Chapter XXXVI in his *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1926.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 439.

tent worker follows the example of Aristotle in making acknowledgement of the work of earlier contributors" (p. 161). Sociologists might do well to pore over his two masterly books, and he might find it worth while to peruse more of theirs. Unless, indeed, our aims are really divergent. For he is investigating, after all his repudiation of it, the processes of *history*, while sociologists are trying to prosecute research into the processes of *society*.

Finally, it would seem that Professor Teggart is especially concerned to arrive at "a knowledge of how things have come to be as they are."⁶ This is unquestionably an important inquiry, but sociologists have subordinated it, for the time being at least, to the logically antecedent endeavor to find out what human nature and group-life actually *are*.

⁶ *Theory of History*, p. 168.

THE RACE PROBLEM*

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MY ONLY REASON for essaying to write on this subject is that so large a place in the literature of the world is given to it and that from many writers there comes the insistent demand, with which I find myself in hearty accord, that the Negro himself must play an important part in the solution of this most intricate of all world problems. In the space given me I shall attempt to state the problem, seek the underlying causes for its existence, and offer what seems to me to be the only permanent solution.

On August fourth (1925) we were in the midst of the Democratic primaries. Having been born in the South, but reared in the North, and never having cast a ballot in a southern state, the writer wanted to know from personal experience just what the white man's attitude is on the question of Negro suffrage. Thinking Negroes, in the South as well as in the North, are beginning to feel that the only wise thing for them to do is to vote for men and measures, rather than for parties. With this in mind the writer felt that since his interest was bound up with that of Virginia so long as he was a citizen of this state, the best thing he could do would be to choose the lesser of two evils, and vote for the best possible Democratic candidate. Therefore, he went to the polls on August the fourth for the pur-

* EDITORIAL NOTE: When this paper was written in 1925 the author was pastor of the First Baptist Church, Farmview, Virginia. He is now professor of history in Wilberforce University.

pose of casting his ballot as a citizen of this commonwealth. At the polls he was met with the pert and emphatic declaration: "This is a primary election for white people only." The writer inquired if this were a state law and was assured that it was. Whereupon he said to the judge: "If this is a state law I want to see it. For I want to see with mine own eyes, if there is such a color prerequisite to the Democratic or any other ticket, on the statute books of Virginia, the home of presidents, the mother of statesmen, and the very cradle of American democracy." The judge was not able to find it on the law books, and a lawyer was called in who said that it was not a state law but a party rule. As a last resort he decided to make an appeal to Rome. He went to the office and sent the following telegram: Hon. John R. Saunders, Atty. General, Richmond, Va. "A respectable citizen, minister of the gospel, is refused a vote in this primary, and told that a white skin is an absolute prerequisite. Wire me your decision." A few hours later came a reply stating that colored as well as white citizens could vote if qualified. The message was presented to the polls, and for the first time in the history of this little Virginia town a Negro cast a ballot in the primary election. Though a few days later we received a personal letter from the Attorney General, stating that the information sent out from his office was erroneous, and that it had been sent while he and his assistant were absent.

We have in Virginia what is known as the Pure-Race law, which declares that any person who has as a maximum, one-sixteenth of a fraction of Indian blood in his veins may pass for white, and enjoy all the rights and privileges therewith. But anyone who is guilty of having the slightest fraction of African blood coursing through his veins shall be defined as a Negro though he be white as snow, and it shall be a crime for him to attend the white

schools, enter as a man into public places, or intermarry with the opposite sex.

What is the reason for the organized activity against the Negro? Or in other words, what is the cause of race prejudices? Is it because of the Negro's color? We think not, otherwise there would be a natural antipathy against everything black. Black horses, black cars, and black clothes would all lose their economic value. Hence we must look for the cause of racial antipathy in something other than the mere color of the skin. As a child, the writer used to play with children of the Anglo-Saxon race, in a little town in New Jersey where he was reared, and there was no thought of color, or racial discrimination, in our youthful minds. But when I had grown to manhood, gone away from home and returned, those same children with whom I had gone to school, with whom I had played and been happy, treated me as a stranger whom they had not seen before. Today, even in Southern cities I see white and colored children playing in the streets together and all are happy. But why is it that these children of different colors who are playing happily together now, inevitably come to the parting of the ways ere they will have reached the adolescent period? It is because parents of the white children teach them that the little colored children are "Niggers," and teach them to despise the infamy that the term conveys. The same white boy that plays in the streets with the colored boy by day may be taken on his mother's lap by night, and told that all Negroes carry razors, that they rape white women, that they steal chickens and watermelons, that they shoot craps, that they are ignorant and lazy, that they are not to be trusted, and that they are to be kept in their places. This propaganda is drilled into the boy; it is illustrated by newspapers and magazines; the Sunday School literature which he studies

emphasizes the truth of it; the pulpit from which he hears the gospel preached sanctions it.

During my student days I was doing hotel work one summer in New Jersey, where I met a man who illustrates just what I have in mind. He came into the dining hall about closing time, and as there was no other guest in the room we engaged in conversation. When the gentleman found that I was a student he began to ask me questions about the race situation in the South. He said to me that he had been as far South as Richmond, and spoke laudably about the way the white people handle the race problem. Among other things, he said that he thought the white people were right in segregating the Negroes, and gave as reason for his opinion that the Negroes are poor, cannot have baths in their homes, and not taking regular baths they have offensive odors about their persons, and for that cause the whites do not want to sit beside them on the trolley cars. I said to him that there are many poor Jews and Italians in the South, who have no baths in their homes and who are characterized by an unpleasant odor. Why not segregate them? On the other hand I pointed out to him the fact that there are many well-to-do colored people in the South whose homes have all the modern conveniences, including the bath. Why segregate them? I asked.

Dr. L. K. Williams, of Chicago, relates a similar experience which he had while traveling through one of the western states. He took his seat in a car with a white family whose children evidently had never seen a Negro, but had received much second-hand information about him. They looked at him very curiously, and finally one of the boys came, and asked him where he lived, and for whom he worked. Dr. Williams told him that he lived in Chicago and worked for L. K. Williams. The boy then wanted

to know if he shot craps and carried a razor. Dr. Williams assured him that he did neither. When the boy had fully satisfied himself that he did not work for a white man, did not shoot craps, nor carry a razor, he then wet the end of his fingers and rubbed them on Dr. Williams' hands to see if he were not a white man painted black. The Negro knows far more about the white people than the latter knows about him. The hard and fast color line keeps the white man in ignorance of his black brother; the Negro reads the white man's daily papers, works in his offices, in his home, while the whites are denied this close contact with the Negro. The daily press does not consider the daily happenings of the Negro news unless it be a Rhineland, or a Sweet case.¹ Hence there is of necessity much gross ignorance on the part of the white people concerning their brother in black.

When the writer was a student at the University of Chicago, he happened to be in a class where there were all white students but himself, and he could not be mistaken for white. One day the professor made use of an illustration in which he made use of the term, "Old Darkie," and as might be expected, everybody looked at the Negro student and laughed. The latter went out and wrote the professor a letter calling his attention to the fact that such terms are objectionable to the New Negro, and asked that he would kindly avoid the use of it in the future, so that there would be no embarrassment to the cosmopolitan groups whose pleasure it was to sit at his feet. The professor apologized and stated that he did not know that such terms were objectionable to anyone.

The Negro was given a free ticket, and brought here without his will or consent, and once here he has well played his part in the development of this our country.

¹ *Christian Century*, November 12, 1925, pp. 1400 ff.

His blood runs like a scarlet thread, all the way from Boston Common, across three thousand leagues of blue deep to Flanders Fields and the remotest shores of France. Our fathers helped to plant the tree of liberty, and we their sons in every generation have been ready and willing to water it with our blood and tears. We claim allegiance to no other flag save that of the stars and stripes; we are not hyphenated Americans.

Hampton and Tuskegee stand as monuments to the genius of Armstrong and the late lamented Booker T. Washington, whose efforts were spent in trying to solve the race problem by means of industrial education. But the fact that the Ku Klux Klan burns the fiery cross on the campus of Tuskegee, and the Anglo-Saxon clubs of America are demanding, and the state of Virginia has passed a law demanding, that segregation be practiced at Hampton are proof positive that industrial education has failed to solve this most intricate problem. Hence we must look in another direction for the real solution, and I hold that the solution will be found in the practical application of the religion of the Cross to our every day human relationships.

RACE FRIENDLINESS AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

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WHEREVER race friendliness develops, social distance is being overcome. Attention, however, is usually given to race prejudice rather than to its constructive counterpart, racial good will. The more spectacular and often melodramatic phenomena do not deserve all the consideration, and hence the origins and development of race friendliness will be considered here.

This study is complementary to a statistical inquiry which has already been published in part.¹ An attempt is made in this discussion to examine the origins of race friendliness. If the processes by which racial good will have developed can be understood, then it will be possible to plan intelligently and specifically for the development of good will in a large way, instead of leaving such processes to be expressed in haphazard ways as is now the situation.

In examining the conditions under which race friendliness occurs, certain behavior sequences are observable. Both direct and derivative experiences account for the origins of race friendliness. Whereas unpleasant experiences lead to race aversion, pleasant experiences are conducive to a friendliness sequence.

In general, it may be said that the person experiencing a growth in friendly attitudes toward some race possesses certain behavior patterns (systems of neurones function-

¹ "Analyzing Changes in Public Opinion," JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY, IX: 372-81, by E. S. Bogardus.

ing as units, and connecting the sense organs with the effectors), which are "set off" or released by the appropriate stimuli. These stimuli occur in the form of the behavior traits of the members of different races. Since these behavior traits (objective) are discernible while the behavior patterns (subjective) of the persons experiencing a growth in race friendliness are obscure, the former will occupy the center of attention in this discussion. The question at issue then is: What behavior traits of the members of races other than one's own race are likely to stimulate one's behavior patterns of friendly reaction? The following types of friendly behavior stimuli have been isolated: (I) Similar culture traits; (II) kindness and congeniality traits; (III) dependability and justice traits; (IV) persecution and oppression traits; (V) non-competitive achievement traits.

A careful study of the seventeen excerpts that are given in this paper, from a large number of reports of the conditions under which race friendliness originates will disclose some things that normally and naturally happen.

I. Similar culture traits are bases of race friendliness. Races culturally similar have points of common understanding and grounds for the rise of fellow feeling. Next to our own races we prefer races similar to our own, because they seem to stand for about the same social values that we do. Races greatly dissimilar from our own represent certain social values contradictory to those we hold. Further, if a person has a fondness for wit, for instance, and finds that an immigrant is likewise witty, a friendship bond not only for that person but for his race may be inaugurated.

The immigrant, however, must not be too superior in his culture similarity. He must not invade our status, but

must be superior in some complementary fashion to our own achievements. He must not detract from us or even "threaten" to usurp our social control in any way.

In order to promote race friendliness on the basis of similar culture traits it would be necessary to resort to an extensive culture education program among all the races concerned. Any educational procedure is to be encouraged which would create similarity of culture traits among different races.

1. My father's parents were Germans, coming to America in their early twenties, just before their marriage. German was spoken in their home and stories of Germany told to their children in their childhood. Their death occurred when my father was in his teens.

When I was a child my father would tell me of the German way of doing different things and would speak German occasionally to amuse me.

As my playmates' parents could speak only one language, I unconsciously grew proud of my father's ability and childlike felt it was because he was of German descent and that the German race was a little superior to other races.

We lived in the central part of Kansas where there are several large settlements of German Mennonites. While we did not associate in any way with these people they had a reputation for being unusually capable farmers and business men. This added to my pride in the German race.

There was no conscious effort on the part of my father to develop this feeling. We were American children in an American home and in an American environment but so deeply was this feeling of pride and good will implanted in me that I found it impossible to believe the stories of German atrocities told of the Germans during the World War.

2. I have a friendly attitude towards the Irish race. On trying to think out, as it were, the conditions under which I developed this friendly feeling towards this race, I found that it is no easy task to figure out just how I developed such an attitude. I think that group heritage colored my thinking on the subject, and determined

my attitude towards this race. Therefore, my attitude is not founded on any scientific or thinking basis.

I am a Catholic and attended Catholic schools all during my grammar and high school life. There are many Irish Catholics and, on the whole, they are very devout and practical in their religion. Their devoutness always impressed me greatly. This is one reason why I feel friendly towards the Irish.

St. Patrick's day always had a special attraction for me. In the first place it always meant a half holiday from school. I loved the colorfulness of it and above all, I loved the stories told me about it. Patrick fighting the snakes for the Irish, and his bravery and brilliance always had a special attraction for me. The idea also, of the Irish people being oppressed for so long made me friendly toward them. It was the sympathy motive to me.

Irish songs always have thrilled me. There is a certain simple, lyric quality about their music and their words that I love. I think this factor influenced me in my attitude towards the Irish.

In conclusion I will state that my racial attitude is favorable towards the Irish because first of all, I have never had any personal or general reasons to feel unfriendly towards them, and many reasons, though not scientific or studied, for liking them and feeling friendly toward them.

3. In the past five or six years my opinions of certain races have changed considerably. Some I have come to admire. Some to respect. Some to regard with a peculiar awe. Others I have learned to pity, and to them my sympathy is extended.

In the study of English History I have learned something of the nature and characteristics of the English people. Also, I have met and been acquainted with many of them. The result, or rather the sum total of my readings and observations of this people has brought me to the conclusion that collectively the Britishers are a fine representative type of humanity; but that individually they do not measure up to several other races, not to my preconceived conceptions of the Englishman. English institutions are, in my judgment, among the best in the world, especially in the field of government. English literature I regard as among the English nation's chief claim to fame. England has produced some of the greatest figures in the history of the world. Yet with all of these splendid qualities the average Eng-

lishman seems, in my judgment, to be uninteresting. I picture him as cold and stern with a lack of a good sense of humor.

Not long ago the Latin race seemed to fill me with awe. I have lately come to regard them with a certain respect. This new view is perhaps due to an admiration for their institutions as I have watched them develop, more especially as represented in the history of the Latin American states. A really stronger bond of friendship has grown up between myself and Latins because of my contacts with individuals of this race. In particular, I find the Latin American man still imbibed with the romantic spirit which seems to be fading into oblivion among most of the other nations of the earth in this great commercial age. Further, this race seems more interested in art and literature than are the English speaking peoples of America. They are more sympathetic than many other races, and more warm friends and companions.

4. Personally, I have no prejudice against any race on the earth, and I have friends from many of the races. However, I suppose my most friendly attitude is toward the Scandinavian people because I have been more in touch with them than any other.

I have been raised in a rural community and in this community I lived in a section which is largely composed of Danish and Swedish people. There are a few Norwegians also. Consequently, a good many of my playmates in the grade school were among the Danish and Swedish. My best girl chum is of Danish parentage, and we have been chums for some twelve years. During my high school days, I held several school offices, and I always seemed to find the students of these races so willing to help and do their share of the work. I found the best literary talent in the whole school among the Danish girls, and I had for my first assistant on the year book staff one of them. I also had boy friends among these races and went to parties and affairs with them. Although they were very much like all other boys I knew, I did find some distinct characteristics. First of all, I found them to be much neater in dress on the average than boys from other races. Secondly, I found them to have more regard for their homes. The Danish and Swedish homes are linked together much closer than the so-called American homes. They have many family reunions, and since their families are usually large, the family is really the social group. The mothers of Danish

and Swedish homes are genuine housekeepers and home-makers. They all know how to sew and cook to perfection.

One of the greatest of influences toward a favorable attitude, was the fact that I had two lovely neighbors, one a Danish and the other a Swedish family. As there were children in each, I was in both homes a great deal. The mother of the Danish family taught me how to crochet and do other fancy work. The Swedish mother always had cookies for us to eat. I loved both homes and thought them ideal.

I have always found these races to be good American citizens. This settlement with which I am so familiar always turns out almost 100 per cent strong on election days, they gave liberally of their sons during the war, gave their money, and they take part in civic affairs. As a whole they are a farming people and do not take so much part in the town affairs, but I have known several town leaders who have been Danish and Swedish. They back up school entertainments and community affairs also. They do "clique" together a great deal, but they do not seem to let their affairs interfere with the good will of the community.

I admire and love the Danish and Swedish people for what they are. They have so many traits of good living which the average Americans do not have.

II. Kindness and geniality traits arouse friendliness reactions. The immigrant or "foreigner" who is generous is doing his race a good turn and promoting inter-racial good will. Temperament figures in the origins of race friendliness. The Irish, for example, are referred to as a jovial, congenial people. Their frankness is also an asset. They have a "giving nature." Geniality arouses friendliness. If an immigrant helps a native "out of trouble," he is repaid with friendly "good turns." Everyone has behavior patterns which are promptly released by kind deeds and by thoughtfulness.

Courtesy, politeness, and respect stimulate friendly responses. On this basis, for instance, Americans develop good will attitudes toward Japanese. One American, out

of many, reports that he has the most friendly feeling toward the Japanese because he has never met a member of that race who has not been "most courteous, polite, and respectful," even more so than his fellow Americans are. "They all act as if it were a pleasure to them to speak to you, and they enjoy doing you a favor."

5. My change of opinion has come about through contact with a number of Filipinos whom I have been forced to work with while employed as assistant in a public library. While working with the Filipinos, I found them to be congenial, friendly, and always willing to lend aid. But at no time did they attempt to force their acquaintance upon us American librarians, and they always welcomed our advances toward them. In general they were quiet, reserved, and well behaved, and meeting the approval of all with whom they worked.

6. Some years ago there moved into our neighborhood a family, the father of which was a white man and the mother a Filipino. Mr. G— was accepted everywhere but his wife was seldom seen away from home. The children were well behaved, kept at home and soon were treated as any other children in the neighborhood. Not long ago we had a fire in our house, and in the confusion I cut my arm on a piece of falling glass. Mrs. G—, who was present, insisted that I come to their house to have the wound dressed, though it was really only trifling. That simple action of kind thoughtfulness and courtesy has raised in my mind the status of the Filipino.

7. Having been born in the South and practically brought up by a "black mammy," owing to the continued illness of my mother, I suppose I have a more kindly feeling toward the Negro group than any other race group.

Somehow it has always seemed to me that the attitude of the Negro has been very favorable toward my race and I have found members of the Negro group sympathetic and co-operative. And I have not always found members of other groups as considerate as the Negro group.

My attitude may be due to my "black mammy," but even so, she isn't the only member of her race group that has influenced my

judgment. However, she ministered to all my childish wants and wishes and in later years has won from me the highest degree of admiration and respect. For it is to her that I owe credit for the formation of earlier habits which are governing my life today.

8. An incident, which occurred recently after I had studied Spanish, increased my admiration and friendliness toward Mexicans. I was cutting the lawn in front of our home, when an aged Mexican came slowly up the hill. He seemed to be exerting all of his energy just to walk. Behind him came a very unhappy looking dog. He stopped on the walk before me and asked for water. I got the hose and started the water to running. He filled his old hat, and to my surprise gave it to his dog before taking a drink himself. As the dog drank I could hear his master mumbling, "Gracias a Dios! Gracias a Dios!" (Thank God) There was something about him that attracted me strongly, so I tried to start a conversation. He told me about the goodness of his dog, and at last, about the strength and eternity of Dio. His attitude, his almost primeval faith, was typical of the Mexican people, and it is a thing of great beauty. I like them because they are a good and friendly people.

9. I have a very friendly feeling towards the Indians. This feeling originated when I was a very little girl because I was born and raised in a town that was located right on an Indian reservation on the plains of South Dakota.

From the time I was old enough to understand what my mother and father talked about, I learned that the Indians in South Dakota were a very friendly, submissive and peaceful people. Even to this day I have a friendly feeling towards them. This feeling has been developed by many different deeds and things of kindness that they have done towards me and my people.

My father was a minister, and many times I used to ride with him to and from his country churches. I remember especially one real cold winter day. It was near sunset and my father and I were driving with a team, homeward. We were bundled up warm but the cold wind blew in our faces—it was a sharp, cold wind. We were singing as we were driving along the lonely stretch of road. We met a buggy. The road was very narrow. The other buggy turned way out into the field in order that we could safely pass. When the In-

dians in the buggy discovered that it was my father they came over to us, asked us if we had enough robes, etc., and gave us a warm "foot grate" that they had, in order that we should not freeze.

The Indians used to bring wild fruit and berries that they had gathered from the nearby groves, to my mother "for the children to eat" and for her "to can." They would also bring turkeys, etc., at Thanksgiving time.

Sometimes, though not as a general rule, would they come to church to hear my father preach. They felt isolated because of their color and life, but would come whenever they felt "it would look all right."

When my father passed away, the Indian tribe there sent a beautiful floral cross. It was labelled "from friends." They sent delegates, as they called them, to the funeral, but, not wanting to take up room of the white friends, they stood outside, with hats off, and bowed heads in reverence for their departed friend.

These and many other instances have developed my friendly feeling towards the Indians.

III. Dependability and justice traits produce friendly responses. To find immigrants wholly reliable is surprising to most people and especially to those who have preconceived notions to the contrary. One is ordinarily suspicious of strangers and "foreigners," but to find them scrupulously honest is compelling.

The immigrant, so often exploited, is likely to develop an exploitation complex and act the part unwittingly. When his economic circumstances have been low, he has had to be penurious. He has handled small coin money to such an extent that he has developed "small coin" contacts with Americans accustomed to large "bills." Sometimes he has come from a "tipping economy" and shirks when not treated generously. An immigrant becomes "attractive" when he acts dependably and renders as much or more service than he is paid for. To find merit where one has not been led to expect it, is pleasing. Genuineness is a trait to which almost any one will respond favorably.

If one is among strange people, or in a situation where he might easily be taken advantage of, in a strange part of his own city, and is treated above-board, and not cheated, he will experience good will feelings. Common decency brings forth favorable responses.

An oppressed race is especially responsive to just treatment. The members of any race, no matter how low on the scale of development, react in friendly ways to fairness. The just dealings of William Penn with the Indians produced a harvest of undying friendliness reactions. "Higher" races also respond appreciatively to honorable treatment.

10. When I was a very little girl, my father had a grocery store in a small country village. Everyone for several miles around came there to trade. Among my father's very best customers was a kind, respectable, and quite well educated Negro lady. Every Saturday when she came to trade she brought her little daughter Levina with her. Levina and I had been friends since I was two and Levina was four years old. I liked her better than any of my other playmates.

One Saturday when Levina came I was out of doors for the first time after a siege of the whooping cough. Levina was very sorry for me because I could not play. We sat on the porch watching my little pet kitten frisk about in the grass. A boy came along with his dog and the usual thing happened. The boy "sicked" the dog on my little kitty. I was not able to run to its rescue, but Levina was and did. She snatched up the kitten, ran down the walk and gave the boy one of the most severe scoldings I have ever heard. I can still see her tight little pigtails bobbing up and down as she shook her head and stamped her foot in indignation.

I have never felt anything but friendly toward Negroes since then and I especially like little girls with numerous pigtails.

11. When I was a small boy my father kept a general store in a rural community close by Pasadena. The county, at that time, was constructing a new road through the district, and there were about fifty Mexican laborers encamped in a little settlement about a half mile from our store. They traded with us for most of their supplies,

and my father, being possessed of considerable blind faith, gave most of the families credit, to the extent of sixty days if necessary.

Few of the Mexican boys of my age could speak my language, but we played together, and learned to make each other understand by means of gestures and facial manipulations. My father, unlike most of the American fathers of the district, did not object to my playing with them, so they liked me for my seeming democracy, and naturally, I responded with friendship. They were more carefree and jubilant than American boys and I came to enjoy their company more than that of my white playmates.

When the road was finished they stayed to work on the Devil's Gate Dam Site, and as a consequence, were in our district for another year. My father had come to trust them very much, and he knew them all as Jesus, or Pedro, or Jiminez, or Paublo. He told me that they were a good devout people, and that the hearsay that they were the most dishonest people on earth was not true.

In the second year of our acquaintanceship with them, a very disturbing incident occurred. Two of the most trusted families of them left without notice, leaving unpaid bills to my father to the extent of two hundred dollars. It was a blow to all of us, both financially, and from the standpoint of our faith in them. My father expected to hear from them by mail, but no news came. After a month had passed we were visited by a committee of the Mexicans. They came into a back room and had a long talk with my father. When they left they were smiling and chatting together as if a good thing had happened. That night my father told us that they had come to pay the unpaid bills of the other families, and that when he had refused to accept it, they had insisted. That experience clinched our belief in the goodness of the Mexican people.

12. Till very recently, I held the Jews in much disrespect, partly supported, but in the main without foundation, except as one might consider prejudice and misinformation reasonable grounds for opinion and belief. I had thought of the Jew in the light of current antagonisms. My views were incorrect as touching the part he played in the killing of Christ, a very excellent character as I thought then and now.

But after personal investigation, and observing Jewish life at close range, I must confess that I am more favorably disposed and more

agreeably impressed with them for many reasons. I have observed that the Jew, in contradistinction to his brother Caucasian has respect for his Negro clientele. He opens up a grocery store in a Negro district, and a colored boy or girl is given a job as clerk. A picture house is put into operation and invariably a Negro girl vends tickets. Having a keen intuition for making money he sees wherein a drug store will go well on a colored neighborhood corner, and immediately a Negro pharmacist is given opportunity to practice his profession, and thereby earn money to set up in business for himself.

This policy on the part of the Jew may proceed from a purely diplomatic angle. He personally, may not have his employee's interest at heart any more than his brother who operates the chain of exclusive stores in the loop, but it must be appraised in economic terms by the one hired and so considered by all who judge his action. For after all, it is better to give a man a job so that he may work, than to have to give him a loaf of bread because you did not give him work.

Another phase of this policy is, that it must be evaluated and placed to the credit of the Jew in terms of religion. He acts somewhat religiously (perhaps unintentionally), in that he gives the job to the Negro when he could put his own race into the position and get the same result.

Similar racial experiences make for sympathetic attitudes. This is shown in the philanthropic efforts of Rosenwald. Anyone holding unfavorable views of a race cannot but change when he reflects on the big-heartedness of this Jew. Others give out of human sympathy, he gives out of sympathy plus racial experience.

The Jew's commercial acumen and business tact excites my admiration, and the fact that he has shown co-operative tendencies to help the Negro in honest endeavor, these qualities cannot be despised in any people and they have had the effect of changing my respect and attitude toward the Jew.

IV. Persecution and oppression traits arouse sympathetic responses. To see other human beings suffering lowers the flood gates of human sympathy. Stories of people being massacred are effective stimuli of friendly reactions.

If one has ever been an immigrant himself and been exploited, he is in a position to respond to the supplication of oppressed races. "The Negro," says a member of that race, "has been oppressed so long and under such a variety of conditions that he can sympathize with all oppressed peoples." Into a Negro district in Los Angeles, for instance, Mexicans and Japanese are moving without experiencing hostility and with friendly relations being established. A fellow feeling toward the Mexicans and Japanese existed among the Negroes before the former races arrived in the Negro district. The Mexicans and Japanese come as persecuted races and hence with favorable responses already aroused regarding them. Whatever induces a person to put himself sympathetically into the experiences of oppressed peoples and to live through their problems, longings, and disillusionments stimulates him to take them into his own universe of discourse, to identify them as being human like himself, and to excuse their racial peculiarities.

13. I stepped into a market run by a Japanese to get some fruit. The proprietor was waiting on an American lady. The happenings ran like this. The woman said, "Charley, have you any nice lettuce?" "Yes," he said, "these heads are five cents and those are seven." "Oh," said the woman, "you should sell those seven cent heads for a nickle—I will take this one at a nickle," and picked it out of the seven cent lot. He shrugged his shoulders and said nothing. The nicely dressed lady then asked about peaches, felt of the different grades, then picked up a peach and bit into it, asked the various prices, then took a dime's worth, picking out the peaches and putting them into the sack. This American lady, well-dressed and appearing to have means, proceeded to pick over the tomatoes in the same way, taking a dime's worth; then the green peppers, finally buying something like twenty-two cents worth; she picked over every article she bought and finally she reached over and took a couple of apricots and said, "Charley, do you care if I give my little girl these?"

When I came home in the evening I told this experience to my two boys and my wife at the table, and say, the boys did get the point; and have on several occasions since, asked if I had ever seen any more of those "finicky" women. That experience has made me more tolerant with the Japanese.

14. From most of the members of the races different from my own, I have been isolated more or less. This seems to be due to a superior or inferior feeling on the part of the member or members of the other race.

Toward the Mexicans I have a very friendly feeling. Although I do not understand their language and do not have the same standard of living as they, I have a friendly feeling toward them. I have been in contact with them many times and have had a chance to study their ways.

My feeling towards them has been a sympathetic superior feeling. They seem like grown-up children leading a simple life. One always has a friendly feeling toward anyone he wishes to help. They seem so simple and helpless. The Mexicans are very harmless if you handle them right.

The Mexicans have been held back for so long that they seem to lack the ability to progress. Anything that we can do to aid them to progress, I think will be of benefit to this country. They form a part of our working class, and society should protect and educate them.

The newspapers and other circulars have put out so much propaganda against the Japanese and other foreigners, but why not against the Mexicans? There has been no need. With a little care these people are easy to get along with. I feel that these people are now a part of our country and that we can either make or break them as we see fit. One cannot help but feel friendly toward them. Friendly feeling toward them seems to be the best way to control them.

15. The fundamental reason for my prejudices in previous years toward the Redman has been because I have not understood him, and his civilization. Too, from my early impressions and teaching, I remember distinctly in the grammar grades I was taught that he was selfish and of a very suspicious nature—a man to be feared and dreaded. Too, that he was a menace, a personality within himself and traditions, incapable of assimilation to our life and development.

However, because I was interested in him as a wearer of beautifully colored beads and so different, as a child—now as a character and fellow citizen, I began to wonder, to read, to inquire about him. I found that it is the Americans that are really the causes for his keeping within his shell, his seeming distrust of us, etc. The average American has shut his door to the Indian, refused to help him to better his culture and civilization—but has taken his land, giving him small payments, merely an opportunity to live. I feel very deeply sorry for the poor Indian. I don't mean that I would be willing to eat, sleep, or drink with any old Indian that comes along, but there are many who have had the best possible advantages and made more of them than any of us do many times, and it is those, regardless of color or creed, I now would be willing to treat as an equal in every way. True, the Indian is offered an equal chance for education, but not for advancement after he has finished.

16. Having been reared in a very religious home, where little or no conversation leading to race hatred was ever expressed, I did not, as many people, form any antagonistic feeling toward any race. However, apart from the way one has been reared, he cannot help noticing the good and bad actions of some races. When I grew older I was always attracted to races who were experiencing unkindly treatment from more fortunate races. I suppose I felt this more keenly, being a member of a less favored race, than other races having less race hatred to deal with. Somehow I always wanted to help members of races who were experiencing any form of race oppression. Many a day I would sit and wonder just what line of work I could enter in order to be of service to fallen humanity or the delinquents of any race. Finally I worked as a volunteer in the County Charities. This position threw me in contact with many races who were suffering mostly from lack of square deal, either because of low wages, which were inadequate for a living wage, or because of lack of adjustment to American modes of living. In getting the case histories some very pathetic accounts are given which causes one to feel that more detailed study of races should be given before any sharp conclusion be drawn, as to inferiority or superiority. I came to this conclusion while teaching in the S—Valley. In my school most of the students were Mexicans of the type that most people think of as low type. Their parents spoke little English and knew little of American modes of living. In spite

of their oddities I visited them as regularly as I did other parents of my pupils. I became interested in all their family life, the births, the deaths, and marriages of the different Mexican families. I always showed them that I was interested not only in their children but in their home life as well. Before the end of the term many of the Mexican women were able to give short talks at the Parent Teachers Association. From these and other facts not mentioned I began to form a very kindly attitude toward the so-called low type Mexican people. I like the Mexicans and they liked me. Parting with my Mexican friends was very pathetic and an experience I shall never forget.

V. Non-competitive achievement traits bring admiration, and admiration leads to friendliness. We admire, applaud, and "go out to" a person who achieves, providing his success does not detract from our status. The achievement of a few persons is credited to the whole race, and friendly feelings are engendered toward the race providing there is no competition with one's own race or nation involved.

17. My admiration for the English is very great, particularly for their empire-building qualities. I think of that island upon which England is located and then of the world-embracing swing of English institutions and language, and rejoice. The solid achievement of the race brings off my hat, and excuses to my mind their frailties. They are not the competitors of the United States so much as the co-laborers, and their achievements make our own the surer. I'm for the English.

This discussion gives a clue to methods of overcoming social distance. It indicates how people in general possess behavior patterns that need only to be released in order to manifest friendly responses. It also gives evidence that there are certain types of constructive behavior traits that immigrants in general may manifest which are the normal stimuli for releasing friendly patterns of action.

Book Notes

INTELLIGENT PARENTHOOD. Proceedings of the Mid-West Conference on Parent-Education, March 4, 5, and 6, 1926. Chicago Association for Child Study and Parent Education. University of Chicago Press, 1926, pp. 326.

This book contains the addresses and round table discussions of the Mid-West Conference on Parent-Education held in Chicago last March. The different sections under which the contributions are grouped include "The Child, the Home, and the Community," "Health," "The Importance of the Early Years," "Research Possibilities in Nursery Schools," "Sex Education," "Problems of the Adolescent—Can the Parent Understand?" "Training for Character," "The Child, the Home, and the School," and finally, "Cultural Needs of the Child."

The subjects, as can be inferred, covered a wide range and gave opportunity for the expression of varied opinions and for a review of many theories. The speakers included among others, Dr. W. W. Charters, University of Chicago; Dr. Ira S. Wile, Mt. Sinai Hospital, New York City; Dr. Rachel Yarros, Director of the Social Hygiene Council, Chicago; Dr. Patty Smith Hill, Teachers College, Columbia University; Carlton Washburn (Winnetka Plan of Sex Education), Winnetka, Illinois; Dr. Frankwood E. Williams, National Committee for Mental Hygiene; Dr. Ernest Horn, State University of Iowa; Dr. Carolin Hedger, Elizabeth McCormick Memorial Fund, Chicago; Dr. John E. Anderson, Director, Institute of Child Welfare, University of Minnesota; Dr. Henry Neumann, Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture.

The foreword, which emphasizes "the training of the next generation to greater mental and physical health and social fitness," states that "the importance of the whole formal system (of education) is trivial compared to that of home influences and training in those vital formation years, beginning at birth, when mental action patterns are determined." The volume is sent forth to answer "the desire of parents for accurate knowledge to aid them in their responsibilities."

B. A. McC.

CONCERNING EVOLUTION. By J. ARTHUR THOMSON. Yale University Press, 1925, pp. 241.

This interesting book contains the first series of lectures delivered at Yale University in the Dwight Harrington Terry Foundation series. It is the contention of Dr. Thomson that the evolutionist view of Nature and Man is not inconsistent with the religious interpretation, and that the evolutionist view enriches and enlarges the religious outlook. The lectures are delightfully written, and presented with a fine degree of clarity. There is little in them that ought to offend the intelligent religious mind. Says the author in one of his concluding statements: "But value is independent of origin, and Man remains 'the summit of the whole' . . . and the idea of God as the Will behind a process of evolution is not less conceivable than the idea of God as acting by special creation." The evolutionist view, correctly taken, reveals man in an ever ascending series, and this, as Dr. Thomson reveals, is much more desirable than the old theological doctrine of the Fall; moreover, it reveals to a remarkable degree, purposiveness. The book is decidedly illuminating and does mark a step which may be taken toward a re-correlation of science and religion.

M. J. V.

THE GOVERNMENT AND LABOR. By A. R. ELLINGWOOD and WITNEY COOMBS, with a foreword by John R. Commons. A. W. Shaw Company, Chicago and New York, 1926, pp. xv+639.

This thick volume presents a well selected group of seventy-one case materials for the study of "the major problems which have grown out of the relations between the government and labor in the United States." Statutes, judicial decisions, administrative decisions, and reports of commissions are brought together under such headings as the basis of governmental regulation of labor problems, the labor union, safety and health, hours of labor, wages, unemployment, and social insurance. They afford a good opportunity for making sociological analyses.

E. S. B.

GENERAL SOCIAL SCIENCE. By ROSS L. FINNEY. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1926, pp. xx+159.

Facts and principles are set forth in this book of twenty chapters, well illustrated, with lesson helps and questions. Simplified psychology, social problems, moral issues, industrial questions, and civic affairs are introduced, but the discussions of each are too brief.

BOLSHEVISM IN TRADE UNIONS. By JOHN A. DYCHE. Boni and Liveright, New York, 1926, pp. xiv+224.

This book will prove interesting to the sociologist mainly because of the material it presents as an insight into the mind of the "Yiddish" employer and worker. John A. Dyche uses the word "Yiddish" to characterize the Jewish immigrant from eastern Europe. He was once a garment worker in England, and continued in such capacity upon his arrival in the United States in 1901. From 1901 to 1914 he served as general secretary of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union. Disgusted with the tactics within the union, he left, and now has become an employer. Much of the blame for the present chaotic condition in the cloak industry he lays at the door of the "Yiddish" workers. One of their chief faults seems to be the habit of wanting to protest about something, another is their belief that the worker is the whole of the industry. He recommends co-operation between employers' associations and the workers' unions, and lays emphasis upon the necessity of arbitration replacing the vicious strike. Not all of his views are sound, and the style is uneven, it being marred generally by a sarcasm sometimes dangerously near the "smart" variety. The author is generally too assured about the validity of his own opinions. But at least, it is a good study of the minds of some of our immigrant workers.

M. J. V.

COMPLACENCY, THE FOUNDATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By ROBERT B. RAUP. Introduction by W. H. Kilpatrick. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1926, pp. xii+201.

The conception developed herein deals with the adjustment relationship which exists in the human organism between crises. This complacency condition "is central in human behavior," and has four phases: formative, quiescent, disturbance, and resumptive. "Behavior" arises from a disturbance of this "complacency condition," which in itself is a fortunate balance of many physiological, neurological, and autonomic factors. A neat argument has been worked out.

E. S. B.

A SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY OF THE PROVIDENCE PUBLIC LIBRARY. By MAY HALL JAMES, Ph. D., Providence, R. I., 1926, pp. 104.

Replete with facts, charts, and illustrations, this painstaking study furnishes a basis for a fine ecological contribution to sociology.

THE WOMAN WORKER AND THE TRADE UNIONS. By THERESA WOLFSON. The International Publishers, New York, 1926, pp. 224.

Theresa Wolfson of the Educational Department of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union is peculiarly fitted to undertake the discussion of the status and the problems of the woman worker identified with the trade union movement, and she has brought to her task her own wide field of experience. The specific problem of her book takes the form of an inquiry into the organization of women workers. That women workers are first of all handicapped by tradition and custom is recognized. She asks if it will be possible to break through this and give the modern woman a new and proper place in the industrial sphere, thus paving the way toward a revaluation of woman's work. Even the trade union has welcomed the advent of the woman worker slowly and reluctantly; it has developed a body of thought and custom which concerns itself primarily with a man's world, and hence, its rules of the game are men's rules. Can women be organized? The author answers in the affirmative, but attaches an "if" to her answer. "If the trade union embodies a number of fundamental changes in trade union philosophy and psychology. If the trade union broadens its structural boundaries to include the unskilled worker—and women are for the most part unskilled. . . . If the union officials . . . incorporate in their plans the psychology and racial traditions of the women to be organized. . . . If the women workers generally will learn to consider themselves a permanent group in industry despite the impermanence of the individual." These are mighty "ifs" however. The book presents much factual material that will prove to be of value to those interested in "women in industry." M. J. V.

SEX FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CONTROL. By CHARLES W. MARGOLD. The University of Chicago press, Chicago, 1926, pp. xi+143.

With a wide range of historical, ethnological, and sociological materials selected from almost countless sources and marshalled in scholarly fashion the author refutes Havelock Ellis' contention that sexual relations are not in themselves social and that sex matters should be freed from social control. The argument for social control of man's sexual acts is well sustained throughout.

HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL RESOURCES. By HENRY ISRAEL and BENSON Y. LANDIS. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1926, pp. x+204.

NEEDED READJUSTMENTS IN RURAL LIFE: Proceedings of the Eighth National Country Life Conference. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1926, pp. vii+158.

RURAL SOCIOLOGY. By CARL C. TAYLOR. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1926, pp. 509.

THE EXPANSION OF RURAL LIFE. By JAMES MICKEL WILLIAMS. Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1926, pp. xv+346.

The *Handbook of Rural Social Resources* is a compilation of data about many rural interests and institutions. "The purpose of the work is to bring together data that has hitherto been widely scattered, to sum up the recent achievements and developments in rural life." The volume represents the co-operated efforts of persons who have done special research in different fields of rural life. Part I consists of interpretations of developments in rural life within the past five years. Of the fifteen chapters in this division, "The Rural Population," by C. E. Lively, "Rural Education," by Ernest Burnham, and "The Co-operative Marketing Movement" are perhaps the most outstanding. Part II is a collection of data from twenty-six agencies concerning programs of national agencies in rural social work. To the general reader seeking information about rural social problems, and the organization, purpose and activities of such associations as the American Country Life Association, the *Handbook of Rural Social Resources* is very valuable.

Needed Readjustments in Rural Life is the eighth of the series containing proceedings of the Annual Conference of the American Country Life Association. This conference was held at Richmond, Virginia, October 27-31, 1925. Part I contains the discussions of the conference, which seem to tend toward indefiniteness and abstraction. E. C. Lindeman's critique of these discussions has a particular interest to sociologists. Part II consists of a series of addresses and papers on such subjects as "Public Welfare and Democracy," "The Farmer's Adjustments," and "The Family and Private Ownership." Part III is given over to the various reports of the Country Life Association. After following the general trend of the Richmond discussions, one agrees with Dr. Lindeman that "the subject for discussion was patently too general."

Rural Sociology is a study of rural problems. Part I gives a discussion of the historic, physiographic, and economic aspects of rural life as a background for Part II, which deals with eleven major problems in rural living. Part III considers the farmer in relation to his community, town, government, and civilization. Chapter XXI, "Rural Social Psychology," is clearly the greatest contribution of sociology proper that Dr. Taylor has to make. Although there may be some question as to the extensiveness of the author's concept of rural sociology, there can be no doubt that he has brought together much valuable and hitherto inaccessible material.

The Expansion of Rural Life is the second of a series on rural development by Dr. Williams. The author, from his twenty-five years of intensive study of rural development, has in this volume presented his findings from the point of view of a typical rural community in New York state. Part I considers "The Period of Maladjustment and Individualism," and Part II "The Period of Readjustment and Co-operation." The entire volume shows, in spite of a somewhat cumbersome style, a keen insight into the forces operating in the processes of rural development, and a rare interpretation of the social values and attitudes of a rural community.

H. G. D.

AMERICA IN CIVILIZATION. By RALPH E. TURNER. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1926, pp. xiv+411.

Designed as an introductory text-book "to life," the author maintains social, psychological, and historical viewpoints throughout his discussion of "the individual and society." He presents the "accumulations" of social heritage in six fields: family, economic organization, education, religion, political organization, and social values. The organization of American life is considered in its individual and social aspects. The author makes no attempt to be sociological but uses the synthetic historical method.

HOW TO DO RESEARCH WORK. By W. C. SCHLUTER. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1926, pp. vii+137.

Fifteen steps in research from selecting the topic, subject, or field for research to developing the form and style of the research composition are presented in simple and lucid, but somewhat sketchy style. More emphasis might well have been put on methods of discrimination of "content" and on distinguishing between formal data and meaningful data.

THE COAL MINERS' STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL STATUS. By ARTHUR E. SUFFERN. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1926, pp. xviii+462.

For its thesis, this volume has undertaken to study the evolution in the coal industry of the latest stage in collective bargaining, or the making of collective agreements between representatives of the workers and of the associated employers. The struggle for collective bargaining began in the decade of the 1860's and had its first climax in the establishment of a joint conference in 1886. But this joint conference, of which much had been expected, proved illusory and collapsed, not to be organized again until 1898. The inability to organize all the miners, and the rivalries of union organizations had much to do with the failure to improve conditions. From 1898 to 1916 the status of the Interstate Joint Conference gained slowly and irregularly, gradually becoming a recognized functioning industrial institution. This period also marks itself as one of general progress both in the improvement of standards of living and in working conditions. Since the war, there is some evidence of a reversion to earlier attitudes, labor having evinced a disillusionment as to the efficacy of governmental intervention. The situation at present is far from satisfactory because of the presence of non-union miners who lie without the field of collective bargaining. The author in a concluding statement remarks: "If the system of collective bargaining is to be maintained and extended, efforts to reduce labor costs are needed as well as advocacy of civil rights which will enable the union to persuade the non-union miners to join the organization." It is to be hoped that the operators who are organized will some day recognize the rights of others to organize; a more efficient industry will rise on the basis of co-operative good-will. The study shows a comprehensive grasp of the entire coal industrial situation.

M. J. V.

THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM. By J. W. JENKS and W. J. LAUCK. Sixth edition, revised by Rufus D. Smith. Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York, 1926, pp. xxvii+717.

The publishers and the reviser of this edition of the well-known work, originally a digest of the 42 volumes of the Report of the Immigration Commission fifteen years ago, are to be congratulated. New chapters on immigration legislation in foreign countries, race problems in the Pacific, and the new restriction law are added. The Census of 1920 has been used and other valuable changes made.

PROBLEMS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION. By PAUL POPE-NOE. The Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1926, pp. ix+218.

This book is intended for the non-technical reader and should prove a valuable source of information for this group. Realizing that the Puritanic attitude toward sex is "one of the crimes of this age" and that many of our divorces and other domestic problems are due to ignorance of sex, one welcomes a book which gives a sane interpretation of the facts of reproduction in a clear, frank, and in-offensive manner.

H. G. D.

SLAVONIC NATIONS OF YESTERDAY AND TODAY. Edited by M. S. STANYEVICH. The H. W. Wilson Company, New York, 1926, pp. xlv+415.

This is one of the latest and best volumes on the Slavonic nations. It is one of the Wilson Handbook Series and is a collection of important articles designed to give the reader a general view of the Slavonic groups from the earlier to the present time. The first of the six chapters is devoted to a general description of the Slavonic race. The other five chapters deal respectively with Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. There are thirty-three pages of well selected references. It would be a great advantage to have volumes like this one covering other racial groups. H. G. D.

THE CONQUEST OF NEW ENGLAND BY THE IMMIGRANT. By D. C. BREWER. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1926, pp. vi+369.

One wonders why this book was ever written or published. The only merit seems to be a few statistics. The author thinks the mythical Yankee is some kind of a superior being and is being crowded out of New England by "inferior" South Europeans; he makes no distinction between Alpine and Mediterranean groups. Yet he produces no proof to show that the Yankee is superior and one questions how such a superior being could be crowded out by an inferior.

H.G.D.

READINGS IN CIVIC SOCIOLOGY. By EDWARD A. ROSS and M. E. McCAULL. World Book Company, New York, 1926, pp. xxi+398.

This book, supplementary to Ross' *Civic Sociology*, contains 156 short but carefully selected quotations from 95 different authors, and presents an interesting array of social facts and thoughts.

Periodical Notes

Changing Attitudes toward Play. Educational attitudes reflect the conditions and demands of the social life of the time. In place of the religious attitude of suppression, which regarded play as a waste of time, educators now insist upon play as (1) a direct educative agent; (2) a mechanism of individual adjustment; (3) a socializing force. Harvey C. Lehman and Paul A. Witty, *The Playground*, November, 1926, pp. 436-438.

Insurance in 250 Unadjusted Families. For illness, accident, unemployment, there is rarely provision, the insurance protecting merely against death. Is the protection worth the expenditure? With an average weekly income of \$20.06, the average allowance for insurance is \$1.14 weekly—and the insurance meets no immediate need. Welfare agencies should give this problem further consideration. H. A. Phelps, *The Family*, November, 1926, pp. 223-228.

What is the Function of the Church? A study of 357 farmers in Minnesota reveals that 4.26 per cent of their living expense is contributed to the rural church. With an increase in incomes, donations to religious and charitable organizations increase more than twice as rapidly. What has the church to offer? Seeing the farmer rather than the church, its duty is to instruct the farmers in an efficient utilization of present rural resources. Carle C. Zimmerman, *Rural America*, November, 1926, p. 8.

Social Concepts in Children. Three hundred and thirty-three children from fourth grade through high school were selected in four cities to study the relation between their use of social concepts and their understanding of these concepts. The "core of response" revealed: (1) the presence of feeling and the absence of meaning. For example, to the concept "Socialist," the core of response, "He's crazy." However, "Knowledge of concepts grows with advance in grade." Talkativeness about concepts also increases with advance in grade. A correlation of $.69 \pm .019$ existed between the number of ideas expressed and talkativeness. H. Meltzer, *The Pedagogical Seminary*, September, 1926, pp. 497-507.

How Much Social Work Can a Community Afford? Though the community is now adjusted to being taxed for the care of its unfortunates, it still lives in ignorance of the worth of Social Work. The latter is face to face with a challenge of failure. Engaged in meeting individual needs, it neglects the opportunity of assuming the rôle of group informant. Bootlegging, crime,—these may call for moral instruction, yet the Social Worker holds his tongue. The early conferences of social workers concerned themselves, in part, with the very organization of Society itself. Is conformity engulfing the field today? Has Social Work any special ethical contribution to make? Jane Addams, *The Survey*, November 15, 1926, pp. 199-201.

The Case for Eugenics. Beginning with Galton's efforts, and the assumption of regularity in heredity, advance and clarity have been consequent upon (1) the discovery by Mendel, of the basic laws of inheritance; (2) the indication that the hereditary constitution, made up of chemical units, "must theoretically be capable of modification." But, eugenists must note, human relationships are not explainable in terms of mere biology. Social factors on every hand tend to modify eugenic methods. For example, individuals not contributing to the continuance of the race may augment our *social* inheritance; eugenic considerations which conflict with social institutions, such as monogamy, would be ineffective. Julius Huxley, *The Sociological Review*, October, 1926, pp. 279-290.

With the Population Mystics. With an annual birth-rate of 35 to 40 per 1,000, the pioneer stock in our Appalachian highlands, though complaining of hardship, makes no connection between population pressure and distress. Whereas indulgence in the common passions may result in evil, the expression of conjugal love is conceived to be "the will of God." Throughout the world, mystical thinking on the problem is in evidence. President Harding congratulates Mr. and Mrs. Z. and their sixteen children, albeit the father is but a low-paid porter; eugenists and economists estimate our population "capacity," with the consolation of feeding them potatoes and hothouse vegetables. Are many to live poorly, or a smaller number well? Edward Alsworth Ross, *Social Forces*, September, 1926, pp. 32—36.

International Notes

THE THIRD PAN-PACIFIC CONGRESS held in Tokyo in November, attended by 150 of the world's scholars from nearly all countries whose shores border on the Pacific, represented another step forward in the world progress.

THE AMERICANIZATION of the world is taking place, but it is an Americanization of which not all Americans are proud. It is an Americanization through jazz music, low-grade movies, and the pursuit and spending of wealth, and divorce patterns.

QUEEN MARIE'S VISIT to the United States has lowered rather than raised the American's estimate of royalty. Not simply her insistence on free transportation but the recent revelations of "the complete suspension of free speech and a free press" in her own country are damaging counts against anyone who openly bids for popularity in the United States.

PRESIDENT COOLIDGE in his Armistice Day speech spiked one of the big guns of the war system. He said: "To expose some men to the perils of the battlefield while others are left to reap large gains from the distress of their country is not in harmony with our ideal of equality. *Any future policy of conscription should be all-inclusive, applicable in its terms to the entire personnel and the entire wealth of the whole nation.*"

THE PACIFIC is slowly becoming the center of world attention. Britain's declining power and the breakdown of standards throughout Western civilization is evident, while the East, with its two-thirds of the world's population, is stirring. "The whole racial process in the Pacific," says J. Merle Davis in an open letter, "seems glacier-like,—vast cosmic forces are moving slowly and irresistibly. . . . It is up to human courage and intelligence to face these glacier-like forces and to devise new channels into which they can be diverted and controlled, and eventually made to serve human ends."